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Abstract:
This paper is a qualitative historical analysis of Northern Ireland’s Troubles.
Over a period of approximately thirty years, sectarian violence in Northern
Ireland dominated the headlines of newspapers in both the Republic of Ireland
and the United Kingdom. Despite this violent history, Northern Ireland has
enjoyed relative peace and stability since the passage of the Belfast Agreement in
1998. This paper aims to better understand why and how Northern Ireland endured
a generation of brutal sectarian violence and emerged into a new era of peace and
mutual understanding. In doing so, this paper incorporates theories from peace
and conflict studies and uses them to frame traditional historical analyses of
Northern Ireland’s Troubles. The ultimate goal of this paper is to integrate
traditional history and contemporary theories in peace and conflict studies in
order to explain the transformation of the conflict in Northern Ireland, thereby
providing a basis to better grasp its current sociopolitical reality.
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1. Introduction
“Conflict is never a static phenomenon. …It is constantly changed by ongoing human interaction
and it continuously changes the very people who give it life and the social environment in which
it is born, evolves and perhaps ends.”
-- John Paul Lederach, 1997
On September 16th 2011, the British Newspaper, The Guardian, ran a story titled
“BELFAST PARK OPENS DOOR TO PEACE.” The ‘door’ in question is actually a gate in one
of the so called ‘peace walls,’ which were built throughout Northern Ireland during the violent
period of conflict known as “The Troubles.” While this particular wall has only been in place
since 1994, others have been in place since 1969. The article continues, “… for the first time
since any of the barriers throughout the city were built over the past four decades, a breach will
be made in one.” Local Justice Minister David Ford called the opening of the Gate in the
Alexandra Park area of Belfast “an important day for Northern Ireland” which required “great
courage [in taking] the first step to open up an interface barrier that has been a symbol of
division and segregation for so long.”
In 1998, a groundbreaking peace agreement, known as the Belfast Agreement, was
signed and approved by the British and Irish Government, which sought to finally put an end
sectarian violence and political conflict in Northern Ireland. The Belfast Agreement was
effective in greatly reducing sectarian violence and developing cross-community relations in
Northern Ireland. But, often less talked about are the long-lasting implications of the Northern
Ireland peace process. The opening of a gate in the Alexandra Park ‘peace wall’ some thirteen
years after the Belfast Agreement shows that the peace process is still in effect in Northern
Ireland. While cross-border councils were set up, paramilitary prisoners were released, and new
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political system was implemented, the strongest indication that peace is thriving in Northern
Ireland is that small-scale, community level peacebuilding continues to take place across the
country.
The continuation of the peace process in Northern Ireland is particularly remarkable
given that the majority of the country’s population was alive to witness during The Troubles.
Following the partition of Ireland in 1922, in which the Government of the United Kingdom split
the island into two self-governing territories (Northern and Southern Ireland). While the Unionist
majority in Northern Ireland expressed a desire to remain within the United Kingdom, the
Republican movement in the South resulted in the Irish War of Independence. Southern Ireland
won its sovereignty and with the ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921, became the Irish
Free State. From this moment on, the island of Ireland became two separate countries with two
competing notions of identity and Unionist hegemony dominated Northern Ireland’s political
system.
The Troubles came about in the late 1960s following generations of Unionist dominated
politics in Ulster. A civil rights movement orchestrated by the predominantly Catholic
Nationalist population of Northern Ireland caused consternation among the predominantly hardline Protestant Unionists, who responded harshly to protesters. It was the harsh backlash in
response to this movement that led to the tit-for-tat violent escalation known now as The
Troubles. Brutal displays of violence tore Northern Ireland apart. Bloody Sunday in 1972, a
massacre of civil rights protesters committed by British soldiers radicalized an already uneasy
Nationalist population. Responses from Republican paramilitary groups such as the Provisional
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) engaged in a violent campaign that was equally atrocious and
condemnable. As The Troubles escalated during the 1970s and 1980s, they attracted increasing
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international attention. Republican Hunger Strikes, assassination attempts on British political
figures including Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher herself, and senseless acts of murder
severely undermined the peace process, leaving many wondering what exactly they were fighting
for. As violent conflict increasingly drew the ire of a population yearning for normalcy in day-today life, Northern Ireland began working towards developing a culture of peace. It was this
ideological shift that allowed a fledgling peace process, which began with the failed Sunningdale
Agreement of 1973, to finally take hold in the 1990s, and point Northern Ireland in the direction
of cross-community understanding, peace, and prosperity.
With similar conflicts still raging across the globe, Northern Ireland’s Troubles have
largely come and gone. This research project is an exploration of why the conflict in Northern
Ireland emerged, escalated, plateaued, and dissipated. Numerous works on Northern Ireland
present a linear history of the country from partition to present, offering a time-line structured
analysis, with dates and summaries of key events. Others offer qualitative studies of Northern
Ireland during The Troubles, which further augment the body of literature by providing
sociological and anthropological analyses of the conflict. This paper is an engagement of both
styles of writing. A synthesis of two academic fields, this paper frames a political history with
several theories presented in peace and conflict studies, with the ultimate goal of constructing a
multi dimensional political history of Northern Ireland’s Troubles. It is my position that by
applying aspects of conflict theory to the political history of The Troubles, we can better
comprehend the transformation of the conflict in Northern Ireland. In doing so, we can more
accurately understand how the damage of three decades of violence is now giving way to
peaceful, cross-community development and pragmatic politics in Northern Ireland.
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2. Literature Review
Introduction
Interpreting the evolution of the conflict in Northern Ireland can be read as an open text.
As the conflict is still evolving, subsequent historical analysis of The Troubles will too.
Academics, journalists, politicians, religious leaders, and members of the public all see The
Troubles through different lenses. Some see the violence of the period as a thing of the past—
buried by the growth of a culture of peace and a fear of the resurgence of sectarian conflict.
Some see the lingering effects of The Troubles as a problem for the present and future, while
others view it on a spectrum, locating themselves and their opinions accordingly. In the
following literature review, I will outline several tenets of conflict theory and will offer a brief
history of The Troubles. The literature review will serve as both a theoretical and historical
framework upon which the remainder of this thesis is built.
On Conflict
Conflict theorists John Paul Lederach and Johann Galtung sit at the forefront of the field
of peace and conflict studies. Lederach’s extensive examination of deeply divided societies
provides a framework with which to approach the needs of key groups within a given conflict
(Lederach, 1997). Galtung is widely known for his research on what he calls “structural
violence,” or the presence of institutionalized disadvantages for individuals or groups because of
socioeconomic, cultural, racial affiliations. Galtung’s concept of structural violence is found at
the root of virtually all conflicts. Both theorists’ ideas are integral to understanding the roots,
outbreak, escalation, and dissipation of conflict, and in this case, The Troubles.
Lederach argues that conflict emerges out of “deeply divided societies” (Lederach,
1997:11) In itself; this idea is not exactly a groundbreaking concept. It doesn’t take much critical
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analysis to recognize that a society deeply divided along the lines of religious, racial, economic,
and or political ideology is ripe for some degree of conflict. From Lederach’s work on deeply
divided societies, we can glean a theoretical understanding of what perhaps was (is) at the root of
The Troubles in Northern Ireland. First, Lederach believes that in deeply divided societies there
is a presence of distinct identity units (Lederach 1997:13). In Northern Ireland, there were
essentially two: Catholic Nationalists and Protestant Unionists (and still are to this day—though
this is slowly changing). Over the course of The Troubles, these polarized communities
increasingly sought security from non-governmental sectarian groups. Protestants often found
themselves looking to the paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force and Ulster Defense Association
for protection that the state-sponsored Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) could not provide.
Catholics, feeling marginalized and targeted by these groups as well as the RUC and British
Army, were ‘protected’ by Republican paramilitary groups including the Provisional Irish
Republican Army, Official Irish Republican Army, and the smaller Irish National Liberation
Army. When paramilitary groups, not state-sponsored law enforcement officials, are given
agency (on a large scale) it calls into question the legitimacy of the state. The development of
this problem, in turn, lends credence to an idea which Lederach supports, that at the root of
conflict ideology is a notion that “if we do not dominate, we will be dominated” (Lederach
1997:15). As we will see in chapter 4, the derailment of early peace agreements during The
Troubles (early 1970s) was due in large part to the pervasiveness of this idea.
Ultimately, Lederach argues that conflict at any level is driven by “psychosocial
elements⎯ long standing animosities rooted in a perceived threat to identity and survival”
(Lederach 1997:17). The conflict in Northern Ireland is no different. With a conflicting ideology
dating back centuries, Northern Nationalists and Unionists have disputed their own self-interest
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for generations, rarely seeing eye-to-eye. Lederach’s conclusions might seem at times
predictable, as he argues that “our challenge is to find strategic and practical approaches that help
establish an infrastructure for sustainable transformation that takes seriously the immediate and
deep rooted needs of divided societies” (Lederach 1997:152). While Lederach offers a discussion
of identity and conflict in divided societies, fellow conflict theorist Johan Galtung discusses the
institutions that cause a society to be deeply dived.
Johan Galtung is well known among peace and conflict theorists for his extensive work
on the concept of “Structural Violence.” A firm understanding of structural violence is important
to the development of a history of The Troubles in Northern Ireland because the sociological
implications of its presence are tremendous. In his work, Galtung expresses that power is not an
abstract concept, but instead something that can be manipulated and distributed much like a
natural resource (Galtung 1969:167-191). This manipulation and unequal distribution of power is
the basic conceptualization of structural violence. Consequently, it makes sense that if a given
society were to minimize or even erase the manipulation and unequal distribution of power, they
would greatly reduce institutionalized structural violence, thereby reducing the likelihood of
conflict.
To give a pertinent example, we might examine a power imbalance present in Northern
Ireland that loomed large until relatively recently. Given the presence of a Protestant Unionist
majority in Northern Ireland, its government was composed predominantly of Protestant
Unionist. Given Northern Ireland in the twentieth century was led by a predominantly Protestant
Unionist government, its economic policies were generally favorable to Protestant Unionists. As
a result of cultural and religious nepotism, Catholic Nationalists were often left with higher rates
of unemployment than their Protestant Unionist counterparts. While no legislation existed
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explicitly stating that Catholic Nationalists were second-class citizens, the power structure in
place prior to and during The Troubles created a situation where many felt like they were. With
the majority of senior positions in the corporate and political spheres occupied by Protestant
Unionists, few Catholic Nationalists were left with a means with which they felt could achieve
upward social mobility. Innocuous at face value, the government set up by a “democratically”
elected majority implemented structurally violent policies, which magnified related conflicts of
identity that had been (although somewhat precariously) lying dormant in Northern Ireland for
nearly half a century.
While it may seem relatively obvious to recognize qualities of deeply divided societies
and relatively straightforward to transform such institutions as the power imbalance Galtung
calls structural violence, it is necessary to integrate recognition and transformation in the
historical discussion of The Troubles. Without doing so, we would be doing a disservice to the
continual development of peace and understanding taking place in Northern Ireland today.
On Conflict Transformation
Conflict transformation theory differentiates itself from modern conceptions of conflict
resolution. Conflict Resolution in its most basic form is just that. The word “conflict” means to
clash with another individual or group in virtually any form. Resolution, from the word resolve,
generally means that a series of actions has subsided for a particular reason. Conflict Resolution
is a blanket term that encompasses all forms of the end of a conflict (be it temporary or
permanent). Conflict Transformation serves to describe a much more difficult, novel mode of
conflict resolution. The Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies, a philanthropic organization
that seeks to promote research and development for effective channels of conflict resolution,
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offers a concise definition of conflict transformation on their website, stating that conflict
transformation is
…[a] generic, comprehensive term referring to actions and processes seeking to alter the
various characteristics and manifestations of violent conflict by addressing the root causes
of a particular conflict over the long term. It aims to transform negative destructive conflict
into positive constructive conflict and deals with structural, behavioral and attitudinal
aspects of conflict. The term refers to both the process and the completion of the process.
As such, it incorporates the activities of processes such as conflict prevention and conflict
resolution and goes farther than conflict settlement or conflict management (Berghof
Foundation on Conflict Transformation, October 2011).
Conflict Transformation can effectively promote conflict resolution. But conflict resolution does
not always mean that a conflict has been transformed. According to Ramsbotham et al (2005),
the absence of war does not necessarily mean peace (p.42). This idea is perhaps the most
significant concept shaping conflict transformation theory, as the basic problem Ramsbotham et
al (2005) posits⎯ that is, the absence of a parallel between lack of visible conflict and peace⎯
reflects the reason why efforts at promoting peace have switched from traditional methods of
conflict resolution to modern methods of conflict transformation. This type of approach to
peacebuilding has been seen elsewhere in the world besides Northern Ireland. South Africa’s
Truth and Reconcilliation commission, and small-scale efforts in Rwanda and the Balkans have
begun to make large-scale results. Rather than put an end to conflicts through new political
legislation or physical force, “conflict transformation’s field of view is intended to [address] the
root causes of social conflicts… while recognizing that some conflicts are not resolvable unless
fundamental arrangements are changed”(Coy, 2009:68). In doing so, conflict transformation
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aims to reengineer what Michael Polanyi describes as our tacit knowledge of conflict. (Redekop,
2002:14). Tacit knowledge is knowledge in its most basic, reflexive form. It is a type of
knowledge that people are largely unaware of, making it difficult for individuals to critically
examine it and also transmit it. In essence, tacit knowledge is the knee-jerk reaction ingrained in
both the individual and the whole. When a young child in school is hit by one of their classmates,
they more often than not will try and hit back. This is tacit knowledge⎯ our most basic
understanding of checks and balances.
When applied to conflict, our tacit knowledge of social group interaction generally
dictates that when one group imposes on another ideologically and or physically, it is important
that the other reasserts its own to counteract this imposition. It is this physical and ideological
interference that generates what we see as conflict. To highlight a brief example, I turn to the
events of September 11th, 2001. An act of violence, the events of September 11th cannot be
condemned enough. But it should also be underscored that a variety of wrongdoings were
committed on both sides before and after that terrible day in 2001. When the United States
invaded Afghanistan, it was seen as justified by the majority of the Western World (myself
included), but the cost to non-affiliated Afghanis has been tremendous. Countless civilians with
no affiliation with or sympathy for the Taliban or Al Qaeda have been tortured and killed for a
crime a group of radical extremists committed. Furthermore, the supposed concern of the BushCheney administration that nearby Iraq was harboring like-minded terrorists involved our
military to a greater degree in a conflict on foreign soil. It was the tacit knowledge of a national
collective that generated the instinctual response of a stricken American Government to retaliate
by invading Afghanistan to ‘’even the score against a dramatically weaker, disorganized fringe
group of terrorists. Playing off fears generated by the Bush administration’s knee-jerk reaction to
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invade Afghanistan, the conflict then escalated when American coalition forces were sent to Iraq,
where they remain, nearly a decade later. The American lives lost in Afghanistan and Iraq,
coupled with the lives of innocent Afghanis and Iraqis have far surpassed the death toll from the
September 11th attacks, begging us to question whether our tacit knowledge guided us in the
right direction, or the wrong direction.
Conflict Transformation demands that we understand, make explicit, and then question
our tacit knowledge before we let it govern our interpersonal and political actions. So while the
symptoms of deep-rooted conflict, such as the events of and subsequent fallout from September
11th, seem completely an utterly unfounded, they are usually the product of generations of
misunderstanding (Redekop, 2005:23). Traditional notions of conflict resolution suggest that an
adequate approach to a resolution to an armed conflict include 1. Defense, 2. Mitigating the
onslaught of the opponent, and 3. Terminating the conflict by coaxing the opponent to surrender
or accept a truce through military force and or political maneuvering. Conflict Transformation
acknowledges that conflict is an undeniable way humans will interact. Conflict, like all other
human interaction, is part of the human relational system. Redekop defines a relational system as
a “context—such as a family, a workplace, or a region in which parties have to deal with one
another” (Redekop, 2005:12). Because these settings are essentially inevitable in our daily lives,
it would be foolish to say that conflict is completely avoidable. David Augsberger further
explains that humanity operates under the preconditions of its culture. In simple terms,
Augsberger believes that since we are born into a social world, we will always experience
parallel emotions and interactions to others, i.e. conflict, loss, greed, anger, pleasure, et cetera.
Solidifying his argument Augsberger cites Foucault, who argues
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…the Fundamental codes of a culture—those governing its language, its schemas of
perception, its exchanges, its techniques its values, the hierarchy of its practices-- establish
for all of us, from the very first, the empirical orders with which we will be dealing and
within which we will be at home (Foucault, 1970:xx as cited by Augsberger 1992:16).
With a background in cultural anthropology and a firm belief in evolutionary anthropology I
have a predisposition to agree with the notion that conflict is a part of human nature.
Anthropologist Clifford Geertz once paraphrased in his Interpretation of Cultures, the ideas of
sociologist Max Weber, “man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he, himself, has
spun” (Geertz, 1973). The scope of human interaction, in its many variations, is engineered
through a process of inevitable social learning. As Michel Foucault argues (and Augsberger
embraces), there will certainly be ‘codes,’ learned or innate, that human beings will adhere to.
However, like Redekop and others I believe our natural inclination to conflict can be mitigated to
a great degree by our ability to think critically. That’s where Conflict Transformation re-enters
the picture, incorporating an ultimate goal of what Rambsotham et al. (2005) citing Wehr (1979)
argues is “not to win, but to achieve a fresh level of social truth and a healthier relationship
between antagonists” (p. 64). In essence, Conflict Transformation leads us to question the
naturalness of Polanyi’s tacit knowledge, Redekop’s relational systems, and Foucault’s
fundamental codes of culture. Because the aforementioned concepts are accepted as innate and
human, they can be plausibly altered.
Take for example the tried-and-true example of Gandhi’s non-violent movement in India
during the 1930s and 1940s. Despite countless civil rights violations and atrocities committed
under British rule, Gandhi, the political and spiritual leader of the Indian independence
movement, sought purge the notion of an eye-for-an-eye from the consciousness of his people.
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Instead of advocating retaliation, which had been up until then a traditional form of conflict, he
advocated non-violence. Through Gandhi’s nonviolent struggle he proved that conflict through
nontraditional pathways is possible. A group can alter the way they participate in a ‘natural’
action such as conflict by critically engaging the impact of their participation in it. It could be
argued that if the entire nation of India armed itself against the British Empire and settled in for a
long war it could have won, but the war might still be going on today—and millions of
individuals could have died. Instead, Gandhi’s nonviolent movement in India achieved the same
results, in a fraction of the time, with minimal casualties (on either side). His ability to critically
gauge the situation in India led to the development of a relatively novel and incredibly effective
form of resistance. Gandhi’s Satyagraha (his non-violent movement) was not a knee-jerk
reaction to British oppression. It was the product of his critical analysis of the fallacies of a kneejerk response to the British oppression. In Polyani and Redekops eyes, Gandhi’s Satyagraha was
a product of his critical engagement and subsequent rejection of the tacit knowledge of the
relational system of British oppression.
At this point I feel it important to interject that for the sake of practicality, this research
project will utilize the ideas of Lederach, Galtung, Redekop, and Augsberger in a historical
context. I feel that doing this offers a concrete historical example of the relatively abstract
concepts each author seeks to illuminate. No conflict is static. External influences, internal
politics, and continual ideological evolution contribute to the dynamic nature of a conflict, and
thus a history of a conflict should be written acknowledging it as such. The conflict that emerges
from deeply divided societies, as Lederach posits, should be understood “analytically as a
progression that moves through different stages” (Lederach 1997:71). The case of The Troubles
is no different, and so their history should be analyzed through a lens of conflict theory and
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ultimately Conflict Transformation. The following section of the literature review will examine
previous histories of Northern Ireland and The Troubles. These histories rely heavily on a factbased historical narrative to articulate the trajectory of one of the most violent internal conflicts
in recent Western European history. They will serve as a juxtaposition of the transformational
history of The Troubles, which creates the body of this thesis.
On The Troubles
In 1801, Ireland and Great Britain were formally joined as the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland. When this act was passed, the Britishness of the island of Ireland was
questionable, but British socioeconomic hegemony was concrete (Hennessey 1997:1). With little
success, Irish nationalists attempted to extricate themselves from the socioeconomic and
geographic confines they felt the United Kingdom imposed on them. The establishment of Irish
cultural organizations such as the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) in 1884 and the Gaelic
League (founded by Douglas Hyde) in 1893 marked the beginning of a revival of Irish
nationalism, but it wasn’t until Easter, 1916 that winds of change began to fill the sails of the
nationalist cause. The nationalist rebellion known as the ‘Easter Rising’ in 1916 provoked an illplanned reaction by the preoccupied (by WWI) British Government. By executing the Rising’s
nationalist leaders, the British catalyzed a phenomenal change in attitude amongst a formerly
apolitical population. Kevin Kelley’s historical analysis of the conflict in Northern Ireland
supports this conclusion, arguing, “England, employing its usual vengeance against Irish traitors
to the Crown, had this time made a gross miscalculation. Ireland was sullen, anguished,
unbowed. In death, the Republican Volunteers were transformed from foolish extremists into
martyred heroes of the Irish Republic.” (Kelley, 1982:33). With growing support for the
nationalist cause, militant ideological conflict began to develop. In 1917, wracked by the plague

17
of World War One, the British government sought to impose conscription in Ireland. This was
met with tremendous opposition from a growing nationalist community. As their leaders were
swiftly executed after the 1916 Rising, members of the nationalist movement found it difficult to
see eye-to-eye with the British government on the subject of conscription. This disagreement
carried over into the general elections of 1918, when republican Sinn Fein, a party whose name
means “Ourselves Alone,” virtually swept the polls, earning a total of seventy three of Ireland’s
one hundred and five seats in British Parliament. (Hennessey, 1997:8). In a seemingly
monumental victory, Sinn Fein took a calculated risk by choosing not abstain from taking their
seats in British Parliament and proclaiming a new Irish Republic, known in Gaelic as ‘Dáil
Éireann.’
At this point, it appears Sinn Fein’s decision to abstain from taking their seats in
Westminster was somewhat of a blunder. Recognizing the long-lasting implications of a direct
affront to British hegemony, the British passed the Government of Ireland Act in 1920, which
expanded the implications of the home rule legislation passed some years before. Because
nationalist-minded Sinn Fein MPs refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the parliament they
had been newly elected to, the subsequent parliamentary discussions at Westminster were left to
the Unionists. As a result, the Government of Ireland act of 1920 was passed. This Act provided
that there be two parliaments on the island of Ireland, one in Ulster, where a majority of Ireland’s
Unionists resided, and the other in what would later (briefly) become known as ‘Southern
Ireland.’ The subsequent Anglo-Irish war (also known as the Irish war of Independence)
culminated in the passage of a treaty that acknowledged the sovereignty of both parliaments and
gave both the autonomy to choose where their allegiance lay. The Dáil in the south, though
unified on secession from the United Kingdom was split on the issue of partition. The parliament
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in the North, dominated by Unionist MPs, opted to remain in the United Kingdom. This
effectively split the island of Ireland along the lines of sociopolitical and religious ideology. In
the South, the heavily Catholic, Nationalist majority became part of the Irish Free State. In the
North, the presence of a British Unionist (Protestant) majority and Irish Nationalist (Catholic)
minority in the North would eventually give rise to a bloody thirty year period of politicoreligious conflict known colloquially as “The Troubles.”
In Northern Ireland, insurgency against the British Crown was not unheard of in the years
after partition, however it was dealt with swiftly and went comparatively unnoticed until it
erupted on the international stage in the late 1960s. While there is no set date as to when The
Troubles commenced and when they finished (or even if they have finished), the colloquial title
‘The Troubles’ generally signifies a thirty-year period between October 1968 (The Derry Civil
Rights March) and April 1998 (the approval of the groundbreaking Belfast Agreement). During
this period approximately 3500 individuals (civilian, military, and paramilitary) were killed.
Irish historian and University College, Cork professor J.J. Lee (1989) offers an
explanation for the development of a heightened state of conflict in Northern Ireland,
highlighting economic downturn in the post-World War II years (1945-1963). As the rest of
Great Britain enjoyed relatively steady growth during this period, Northern Ireland was not
invited to the party. Catholics were hit hard during this period, mired in economic purgatory with
an absurd 17.3% unemployment rate. Comparatively, Protestants maintained a lower rate of
employment, with only 6.6% unemployed during the same period (1971) (Lee, 1989:412). Lee,
writing in the late 1980s, acknowledges these statistics should be noted in a discussion as to what
internal factors unique to the late 1960s catalyzed the onset of The Troubles. But he leaves any
further speculation as to the significance of these figures to the reader.
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As The Troubles progressed, they took a tremendous toll on the people of Northern
Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, and mainland Britain. Paramilitary violence was all too
common. Bombings occurred frequently and were to be expected on any day of any month, of
any year. Political disagreements, riotous protests, sectarian discrimination, hunger strikes, and
failed cease fires lasted for thirty years. But in 1998, a groundbreaking peace agreement, known
as the Belfast Agreement, was voted on and passed into law. Save for a comparatively small
amount of sectarian violence, The Troubles have largely dissipated in the years following this
agreement. While the heyday of paramilitary violence has come and largely gone, stark political
divides still exist in Northern Ireland. This is because Northern Ireland, like many other conflict
zones, is a politico-geographic region whose existence is still hotly contested. Historically, the
prevailing political discourse in Northern Ireland (Nationalist versus Unionist) is predicated upon
conceptions of internal and external national allegiance and religious preference. (Hayward
2006). Contemporarily, the prevailing political harmony in Northern Ireland is predicated on a
recognized commitment by these two conflicting ideologies to work together (power sharing
agreement as set forth by the Belfast Agreement). The very foundations of the current system of
government in Northern Ireland reify the presence of two conflicting ideologies while
simultaneously acknowledging that they can work together in the interest of the people of
Northern Ireland.
I have consciously chosen to omit individual historical analyses of each of the topics I
will specifically discuss in chapter four in the literature review. This is because the historical
discussion offered by the likes of Lee, Hennessey, Kelley and others will be synthesized with the
theory set forth by Lederach, Augsberger, Redekop, Galtung, Foucault and others. In essence,
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the body of this thesis will combine the two branches of academic discourse presented in this
literature review⎯ conflict theory and political history.
3. Methodology
This paper is qualitative in nature. The ‘data’ collected in the following chapter is an
amalgamation of primary documents, newspaper articles, radio and television reports, and
historical analysis. These sources are then framed with theories presented in conflict studies with
the ultimate goal of explaining how Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland occurred over
the course of The Troubles.
Method of Research: Textual Analysis
To build a ‘frame’ for the thesis of this paper, in this case the political history of the
conflict in Northern Ireland through a lens conflict theory, I read a work on conflict theory,
dealing with a spread of topics including peacebuilidng, violence, Conflict Transformation,
reconciliation, and divided societies. This was important because I needed to have a sound
understanding of the various expressions of, reactions to, and theories behind conflict and
Conflict Transformation. Using a basic framework of Conflict Transformation, I built upon my
argument by reading and analyzing historical texts of The Troubles. Finally, I searched for
newspaper accounts, official statements, primary documents, and television and radio broadcasts
to fill in what the academic historical record leaves out.
Methodology
Gleaning information from historical texts, primary documents, newspaper articles, and
various other media releases had a twofold importance to the project. First and foremost, each
text contributed to a more complete understanding of The Troubles. In addition, the different
presentation style of each text painted a different story of The Troubles. Historical texts often
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came across as overly brief and unemotional. Conversely, primary documents (i.e. actual text of
peace agreements) and official statements conveyed the aspirations of the upper echelons of the
political realm, which ranged from disgust to hope and solidarity. Newspaper articles covered the
spectrum as well, with pictures and bold lettered print that often sought to capture the emotions
of a nation ranging from shock and condemnation to cautious optimism. As outlined earlier, the
goal of this thesis is to provide a more three-dimensional analysis of The Troubles in order to
better understand the evolution of the sociopolitical landscape in Northern Ireland.
In the following pages, you will be presented with almost thirty years of both primary and
secondary reports of The Troubles. Each section is formatted the same. First, an introduction
outlines the event or topic and how it pertains to the evolution of the conflict in Northern Ireland
by using a specific dimension of conflict theory. Next a presentation of primary sources follows,
unsurprisingly found under the title Primary. The content in this section varies from event to
event, some with a wide range of primary documents and some with just newspaper headlines.
The purpose of this section is to present raw data, more often than not, from within twenty-four
hours of the event in question occurring. This information is valuable in helping to grasp the ebb
and flow of emotions over the course of The Troubles, something that is often left out of
traditional historical analysis. Then, there is an analysis of academic history of The Troubles,
aptly titled Academic. This section compiles various excerpts from historical texts as they pertain
to the event or topic in question. This information is used as a contrast to the primary sources, as
it is often written months or years after-the-fact, with the benefit of hindsight. The next section
Synthesis, integrates both Primary and Academic with conflict theory, in order to locate each
event on the spectrum of Conflict Transformation. While the majority of the paper is written in a
chronological fashion, section 4.3 is details events that occur in the midst of the events of section
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4.2. This is because this paper is designed to build off of the theories presented in the previous
section. As you are reading, you will find that the conflict theory discussed in section 4.4 is
predicated upon recognition of theories presented in 4.3 and so on and so forth.
Chapter IV
Data and Findings
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to a growing body of work on conflict theory
and more specifically Conflict Transformation Theory. While contemporary Conflict
Transformation Theory generally serves as a framework for addressing future and continuing
conflicts, this paper uses Conflict Transformation theory and applies it to a political history, in
hopes of illustrating a process of conflict evolution—a process of gradual change over time
brought about by changing political and social tides. This is a concept that I believe is important
to understanding both the history and the future trajectory of all conflict.
Traditional histories of The Troubles read much like a timeline, with a focus on dates,
politicians, and events. Anthropologies of The Troubles, though not unheard of, are relatively
uncommon. This section of the research project examines numerous transformative events of
The Troubles that span from shortly after their onset in 1968 to spring of 1998. The data in this
section will be presented with a summary of the event or topic first, followed by a presentation of
primary sources (including newspaper articles, personal testaments, interview transcripts, and
government documents). These are juxtaposed by the use of an analysis of a range of political
histories of The Troubles. From there, I will utilize concepts of conflict theory to illustrate how
the conflict in Northern Ireland escalated, evolved, dissipated and ultimately transformed
through active and passive internal and external forces.
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Brahm (2003) uses a curve to model the trajectory of modern conflict

4.1 Conflict Emerges in a Deeply Divided Society: The Northern Ireland Riots of 1969,
Internment, and Bloody Sunday
In the half century following partition, Northern Ireland managed to maintain a
semblance of peace. However, as the last remaining part of the United Kingdom on the island of
Ireland, the political system in Northern Ireland echoed the sentiments of the Ulster Covenant.
Signed by Ulster Unionists in 1912, it expressed the desire of a large population of Ulster
Protestants to remain in the United Kingdom and adamantly opposed Home Rule. Those who did
not sign included a significant minority of Ulster Catholics, faithful to the idea of a sovereign,
United Ireland. Over subsequent generations, discriminatory sectarian policies began to dominate
the cultural and political arena in Northern Ireland, further entrenching the country’s population
in the narrative that Northern Ireland is, as Lederach (1997) describes, a deeply divided society,
with distinct units of cultural, religious, and political identity. While comparatively small-scale
civil rights protests and occasional acts of sectarian violence were not uncommon prior to in the
half-century following partition, they became commonplace after the onset of the Northern
Ireland Riots in 1969. Between January of 1969 and the months following Bloody Sunday in
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January of 1972, the conflict in Northern Ireland erupted on the international stage, setting in
motion a tumultuous thirty years that saw discrimination, violence, governmental change, and
eventually ground-breaking peace agreements.
4.1a Northern Ireland Riots of 1969
In the late 1960s several civil rights movements sprung up in Northern Ireland to protest
unfair housing legislation, police brutality, and sectarian discrimination. The civil rights
movement was led by the appropriately named Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association
(NICRA), which, beginning in 1969, launched a series of marches primarily in opposition to the
absence of a one-man-one-vote policy in Northern Ireland. A somewhat outdated system of
franchise, voters in Northern Ireland were required to be property owners. This was an issue for a
large portion of Catholics in Northern Ireland, as they mostly fell in the lower-middle and lower
class brackets of the socioeconomic ladder in Northern Ireland. Despite the fact that Catholics
possessed nearly 40% of the overall population in Northern Ireland, they were blatantly
misrepresented at Stormont, with Protestant hegemony drowning out calls for political reform.
As riots broke out in 1969, the opposition’s response was unexpectedly brutal, radicalizing much
of the Catholic population across Northern Ireland and repulsing those in the Republic of Ireland.
Primary
Burntollet Ambush
When a Northern Ireland civil rights group called People’s Democracy staged a march
from Belfast to Derry in January of 1969, they were attacked at Burntollet Bridge outside of
Derry. Controversially, the Royal Ulster Constabulary did nothing to intervene in the ambush.
Conflicting reports suggest RUC members even partook in the assault on marchers. Following
the assault on People’s Democracy protesters at Burntollet Bridge, the Irish Times headline read:
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“O’NEILL MAY CALL UP SPECIAL POLICE. PREMIER WARNS ‘WARRING
MINORITIES.’ PARTISANSHIP OF R.U.C. BECOMES THE BONE OF CONTENTION”
(The Irish Times, January 6, 1969). People’s Democracy marchers were ambushed three times in
the last 10 miles of their journey, and approximately three hundred people were injured. At the
root of the Nationalist outcry, the article states, was that police forces following the march “were
partisan in dealing with demonstrations.” Consequently, civil rights protesters declared an end to
any form of ‘truce’ in Northern Ireland.
Battle of The Bogside
A Unionist march on August 12th near the Bogside neighborhood of Derry caused
consternation amongst a large population of objecting Catholics who began attacking marchers
as they approached the Bogside in Derry. Contrary to the Burntollet ambush, the RUC intervened
this time, beginning a pivotal skirmish known colloquially as the ‘Battle of the Bogside.’ In
describing the events of the day, the Irish Times went with the headline: “TEAR-GAS USED
ON DERRY RIOTERS: 112 CASUALTIES AS POLICE BATTLE BOGSIDE BARRICADES”
(The Irish Times, August 13, 1969). The article describes the general state of anarchy present in
the Bogside during the riots. It continues, “[i]n Derry a force of 1,000 policemen charged and
countercharged Catholic youths who rained stones and petrol bombs on them….” A neighboring
article on the front page of the Irish Times cites RUC officials as stating that the riots in the
Bogside appeared to have been premeditated by local residents who used “hundreds of petrolbombs… [that] must have been prepared in advance” (Irish Times, August 13, 1969). News of
violence towards Irish Catholics in the Bogside generated concern in the Republic of
Ireland⎯concern, which Irish Taoiseach Jack Lynch famously articulated on national television
in the Republic of Ireland.
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Lynch’s Response to the Riots in Northern Ireland
On August 13th Irish Taoiseach Jack Lynch delivered a televised address to the people of
the Republic of Ireland directed at the British Government. The speech, colloquially referenced
to now as Lynch’s “We will not stand by…” Address, implores the British Government to apply
for a United Nations peacekeeping force to manage the rapidly escalating conflict in Northern
Ireland. In solidarity with the sentiments of Catholics and Nationalists in Northern Ireland,
Lynch acknowledges, “the RUC is no longer accepted as an impartial police force…”(Lynch,
1969). Lynch’s statements were seen as a direct affront to the decision making process in
Northern Ireland, where Prime Minister James Chichester-Clarke had been contemplating
requesting the deployment of the British military to resolve the situation in Northern Ireland.
Lynch also proposed that the British Government and Stormont actively consider
reassessing the constitutional status of the six counties in Northern Ireland, stating because “the
reunification of the national territory can provide the only permanent solution for the problem, it
is [the Irish Government’s] intention to request the British Government to enter into early
negotiations with the Irish government to review the present constitutional position of…
Northern Ireland”(Lynch, 1969). To some Unionists in Northern Ireland Lynch’s speech was
viewed as a threat of invasion of Northern Ireland by the Republic of Ireland. While it contained
strong words of disapproval, it can be assumed Lynch understood that an invasion of Northern
Ireland by an underprepared and numerically inferior Irish military would be highly impractical.
(A complete transcript of Lynch’s speech can be found in appendix1.1)
1969: A Year That Changed Everything
A December 31st, 1969 article in the London Times eerily prophesized the forthcoming
Troubles in Northern Ireland. The article, titled, “OLD QUARRELS IN A NEW GUISE,” leads
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with a somewhat ominous opening sentence, the article argues “[n]othing will be the same in
Northern Ireland after 1969, one of the most critical of all the crisis years in Irish history”
(London Times, December 31, 1969). The article describes the escalation of the conflict in
Northern Ireland from bricks to bullets in a matter of months. Almost like dominos, the riots of
1969 led to the collapse of any semblance of order in Northern Ireland. The tone of the article is
relatively subdued, as it aims merely to summarize the events of the year in Northern Ireland,
rather than necessarily lead its readers towards any conclusions other than their own. If anything,
the article highlights the uncertainty that dominated the political arena in Ulster at the time.
Following a brief description of the resignation of minister of commerce, Brian Faulkner, Prime
Minister Captain Terrence O’Neill held a general election, which, though dominated by
Unionists, displayed massive ideological fragmentation in the Unionist population. The
fragmentation of the Unionist population was juxtaposed by the growing coalescence of the
Nationalist cause. As civil rights were continually violated, demands were not met, and the RUC
continued to turn the other cheek, political unrest grew in Catholic areas, culminating in the
Battle of the Bogside in August of 1969 and the subsequent arrival of British troops. The
Troubles had officially begun.
Academic
Much like the ‘year in review’-style article in the London Times, the historical literature
on 1969 in Northern Ireland suggests that the events of the year did change everything. Civil
rights marches in early 1969 greatly exposed the sectarian nature of the RUC. They also placed
the plight of Catholics in Northern Ireland on the international stage to a degree unmatched by
efforts in years prior. The events of 1969 saw an increase in paramilitary recruitment and thus
paramilitary violence, thereby generating international concern evidenced by Lynch’s assertion
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that Great Britain should apply for a U.N. peacekeeping force, Chichester-Clark’s refusal, and
the eventual arrival of British troops in Northern Ireland for the first time since the 1920s.
Irish historian J.J. Lee offers a candid explanation of the tumultuous developments of
1969. While he highlights the legitimacy of the cause of the People’s Democracy march in
January of 1969, he makes note of their decision to march through protestant territories in Derry
during the last ten miles of the march for which they were “duly assaulted at Burntollet, with the
complicity of the police, and apparently the participation of individual policemen” (Lee,
1989:422). Not only was the RUC was an overwhelmingly Protestant police force, Lee (1989)
notes that the RUC was also the only armed general police force in the United Kingdom. General
police forces in England, Wales, and Scotland were (for the most part) unarmed. Additionally,
the Garda Síochána of the Republic of Ireland was also an unarmed police force. As they were
responsible for patrolling a hotly contested geographic region, the RUC being the only armed
general police force in the United Kingdom is relatively unsurprising. What should be
acknowledged at this juncture is the amount of power entrusted to a firearm-carrying police
force. The RUC was under intense pressure from all sides of the sociopolitical arena. To
Stormont, they were responsible for maintaining law and order so that Westminster would not
have to intervene in the day-to-day operations of Northern Ireland. To Unionists, the RUC was a
police force tasked with a difficult job of protecting the interests of the people of Northern
Ireland in the name of the Queen. To Nationalists, the RUC was the was a biased police force
that turned a blind eye when it came to protecting Catholics from violence in Northern Ireland.
As violence escalated, a slough of bombings occurred on April 23, 1969. Originally
thought to be the work of the IRA, the bombings were later attributed to the Ulster Volunteer
force (UVF), a Loyalist paramilitary group. These bombings were part of the UVF’s somewhat
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cannibalistic political goal of destabilizing the Government of Northern Ireland, led by Terrence
O’Neill, whom they felt was too reform-minded for Protestant Ulster. It appears as though
O’Neill was stuck between a rock and a hard place as his reforms were viewed as meaningless to
disenfranchised Catholics (Hennessey, 1997:161-162). The riots of 1969 generated internal
fragmentation in the Unionist camp as Prime Minister O’Neill’s decision to investigate the
abuses at Burntollet triggered the resignation of dissenting cabinet member Brian Faulkner. With
a call for general elections, the fragmentation in Northern Unionism became readily apparent.
Lee writes, “little at this stage could have prevailed against a resurgence of sectarian sentiment
and the virtually total polarization of the two ethnic groups in Northern Ireland” (Lee, 1989:424).
With both Catholics and Protestants failing to see eye to eye, as well as internal disarray among a
conflicted Unionist population, the political environment in Northern Ireland rapidly heated up in
1969, ultimately exposing for the first time in decades, the truly divided nature of Northern
Ireland’s sociopolitical landscape.
Synthesis
The events of 1969 suggest that the political system in Northern Ireland was far from
perfect during the years following partition. Still, why was it that 1969 was the year in which a
relatively dormant conflict became quite active? Lederach’s work on deeply divided societies
offers some suggestions, in the form of characteristics of deeply divided societies like Northern
Ireland.
The most noticeable marker of the divided nature of the sociopolitical realm in Northern
Ireland is the fact that the conflict in question (in 1969) was “lodged in long-standing
relationships” (Lederach, 1997:14). Opposing parties of the conflict in Northern Ireland had
lived side-by-side for generations. In fact, the Apprentice Boys march that provoked the Battle of
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the Bogside was to commemorate the Relief of Derry, which occurred some three hundred years
earlier. Catholics and Protestants have shared the geographic territory in Northern Ireland for
centuries, and while clashes were not uncommon, they were often accepted as an inevitable part
of Northern Irish life. Like a volcano lying dormant, calls for political change and equal rights
falling on deaf ears meant that frustrations were bound to erupt into violent conflict⎯and they
most certainly did in 1969.
Furthermore, increasing fragmentation of social groups in Northern Ireland along ethnic
and sectarian lines of identity exposed of the fallacies of the state’s political system. While
Catholic civil rights protesters began to unite against disenfranchisement by Stormont, Unionist
hegemony began to crack. Lederach argues that in deeply divided societies, “people seek
security in increasingly smaller and narrower identity groups” (Lederach, 1997:13). The assault
on civil rights marchers at Burntollet exemplifies this phenomenon quite well. As unified
Catholic indignation unsettled the Protestant-favorable status quo in Northern Ireland, the
supposedly impartial but virtually entirely Protestant, RUC acted along sectarian lines as rather
than honoring professional obligations (even though they may have not seen it that way at the
time). Viewing the Catholic march as a direct affront to their Protestantism, on duty RUC
members turned a blind eye while their fellow off duty compatriots participated in the Burntollet
assault.
What came in the following months was an escalation of violence by paramilitaries on
both sides of the conflict and the emergence of the mentality that Lederach (1997) describes as,
“if we do not dominate, we will be dominated” (p.15). The battle between Bogside Catholics and
the RUC during the Battle of the Bogside represented another turning point in 1969, as the
inability of Northern Ireland to assume control of its warring people provoked two key events.
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The first was Jack Lynch’s stern statement of the Irish Republic’s disapproval of the inability of
Northern Ireland security forces to stop the violence. In his statement, Lynch also reasserted the
firm belief of the Republic of Ireland that the reunification of the island of Ireland was the proper
solution to the violence in the North. Furthermore, Lynch appealed to the British government to
request a neutral UN peacekeeping force to be deployed to conflict areas in Northern Ireland in
an attempt to restore order.
Northern Ireland’s penultimate Prime Minister, James Chichester-Clark was relatively
unmoved by Lynch’s demands, acting in line with Lederach’s assertion that “the international
community’s ability to respond [to intranational conflict] is limited” (Lederach, 1997:18).
Consequently, Chichester-Clark requested that the British Government deploy troops to Northern
Ireland to settle the situation in the Bogside—they did so, temporarily. An unforeseen
consequence of the presence of British troops’ arrival was the creation of Nationalist controlled
“no-go” areas, which were patrolled by Nationalist paramilitaries who forcibly blocked the entry
of British patrols. These no-go areas in Derry further support Lederach’s claim that in deeply
divided societies, individuals (in this case nationalists) seek security from within. In just a matter
of months the political divide in Northern Ireland had evolved from stone throwing to what was
essentially a war zone. The disturbances of 1969 were not a product of IRA or UVF provocation,
but a complex mix of “communal disturbances” arising from a “complex political, social, and
economic situation” in Northern Ireland (Scarman, 1969:2.4). While Unionists have remained in
power to this day, the fragmentation of their political platform in 1969 stoked the flames of the
Catholic civil rights movement. As we will learn in the next section, the emergence of the
Catholic civil rights movement in 1969 would contribute to a new wave of marches, conflict, and
controversy, culminating in one of the most pivotal events of The Troubles—Bloody Sunday.
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4.1b

Internment and Bloody Sunday
Despite a ban established by Northern Ireland’s Parliament at Stormont on all forms of

protest marches, civil rights protesters (mostly nationalists) gathered for a march on January 30th,
1972 in the Bogside area of Derry city. The march was organized to protest a controversial
security measure enacted by Stormont called Operation Demetrius, known colloquially as
‘Internment,’ which had been implemented four months prior in August of 1971. A matter of
hours after the march began, 13 civilians were dead (a fourteenth died some months later due to
injuries sustained that day). All fourteen individuals were shot dead by the high-powered rifles of
the 1st Battalion of the British Army’s Parachute Regiment. While bystanders reported hearing
only the sound of British Army gunfire, initial reports and statements released by the British
Government maintained that the “Paras” (British Paratroopers) were fired on first. The events of
Bloody Sunday should be highlighted not simply because they were shocking, but because they
serve as a barometer of the degree of destructiveness of The Troubles during their early years.
Bloody Sunday, because of the sheer volume of international and domestic support for the
Nationalist cause in Northern Ireland it drummed up, is the foremost polarizing event of The
Troubles in the early 1970s.
Primary
In the days and months following Bloody Sunday, numerous testimonies and statements
were released as to how the events of January 30th transpired. The following is a collection of
what I have termed “Primary Reports” or non-academic primary sources that detail the events of
Bloody Sunday. It is important to acknowledge the presence of personal or media bias in these
sources.
Video
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A January 30th, 1972 BBC News clip shows a montage of the events of Bloody Sunday.
The first portion of the video depicts marchers moving slowly en masse along the road. At one
point, protesters appear to throw stones. Shortly after explosions, the sound of live rounds being
discharged can be heard over quiet, whirring audio interference. Around midway through the
video, an unidentified individual can be heard shouting “Murderers! You Bastards!” The video
cuts to footage of what became an iconic image of Bloody Sunday, that of Father Edward Daly
and several others carrying the lifeless body of John “Jacky” Duddy (one of the fatalities of the
day) through an alleyway while simultaneously waving a blood stained white flag. Following
this, more gunfire is heard as well as footage of British troops maneuvering about the Bogside.
The footage then cuts to interviews (See appendix 1.2 for full transcript of the news clip)
Presented in the film are two narratives of the events of Bloody Sunday. The first is that
of Catholic priest, Father Edward Daly. Daly’s testament is at the very least representative of the
perceived innocence of the civil rights protesters. A photo of Daly and a cohort of presumable
bystanders carrying the lifeless body of Jacky Duddy is one of the most prominent images of the
day, having been reproduced quite frequently. Today, the image has been replicated on a wall of
one of the homes in the Bogside, adding to an already rich collection of nationalist artwork in
Northern Ireland. Daly’s testimony that the actions of the British army were “outrageous” and
“disgraceful” quite accurately represents the feelings of numerous observers sympathetic to the
nationalist cause.
Conversely, statements made by General Robert Ford, commander of British Land Forces
in Northern Ireland, paint a much different picture, suggesting that the environment was an
incredibly dangerous one for the highly armed British soldiers. While Daly questions how the
Paras can call themselves an army, General Ford calmly and confidently asserts that his men
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acted responsibly and “did not open up until they had been fired at.” He goes on to further
establish that the British army would not have had to “restore law and order” if the “hooligan
element” didn’t take over the order of the protest.
In the weeks and months following Bloody Sunday, the contrasting stories of Father Daly
and General Ford remained major points of contention, with Nationalists and even some
Unionists calling the events of the day a massacre. Of course, how individuals viewed Bloody
Sunday was often directly correlated to their political views. To make matters worse, official
statements further served to polarize both angry and fearful citizens of Northern Ireland, the
United Kingdom in general, and the Republic of Ireland.
Audio
The following is an official UPI (United Press International) audio service transmission,
presented by William L. Rukeyser, which detailed the events of Bloody Sunday. Rukeyser was
an American freelance reporter living in Belfast in the early 1970s. Rukeyser narrates,
…a number of civilians have been killed by the British army during the city’s
(Londonderry) worst day of violence. The day started with a peaceful, but illegal march in
which about 20,000 people took part. When the march reached an army barricade near the
city center, troops used tear gas and a water cannon. The shooting started while the
marchers were retreating. The army claims snipers started the shooting but army fire was
far heavier and was directed at civilians. Besides those killed, many more people were
injured.
--William L. Rukeyser, Londonderry, Northern Ireland
Wednesday, February 2nd, 1972.
Statements
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Stormont, the British Military, the British Legal System, the Irish Government, and local
politicians released official statements addressing the events of Bloody Sunday. The following is
a collection of excerpts from official statements released following Bloody Sunday.
The ‘Widgery Report’ was among the most controversial of official statements formally
released after Bloody Sunday. Lord Widgery was appointed by the British Government to
oversee an investigation of both the actions of the British army and the deceased civilians on
January 30th, 1972. After weeks of investigation, including the testimony of 114 eyewitnesses
(Rucker, 2002:97), Widgery’s report was released on April 10th 1972. Controversially, it
exonerated all British soldiers of any wrongdoings, which infuriated Nationalist sympathizers
and undermined the credibility of the British government’s management of the quickly escalating
Troubles. Widgery’s report was lambasted by both nationalist and non-nationalist supporters
alike, who felt that the report was hastily compiled and did little to place guilt upon the shoulders
of those who fired live rounds into crowds of protesters. Widgery concludes with several key
points, which I have included in appendix 1.3
Widgery’s report was not well received by Nationalists, who felt it severely downplayed
the atrocities of the day. While prior injustices of The Troubles could be attributed to
paramilitaries on both sides, deaths on Bloody Sunday were attributed to a recognized, statesponsored, military force. The British army entered Northern Ireland in some years earlier in an
effort to restore order to a region where anarchy was beginning to take control. The events of
Bloody Sunday changed the mindset of many Nationalists from a position of ambivalence
towards the British army to radical opposition. To pour salt on an open wound, the governmentdirected Widgery inquiry produced questionable conclusions as to where guilt lay, further
provoking an already deeply concerned nationalist population in Northern Ireland.
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On the Nationalist side, political figures in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland
expressed disgust at the actions of the British troops. Bernadette Devlin a nationalist, and then
the youngest MP at Stormont voiced her sentiments about Bloody Sunday, decrying “[n]o body
shot at the paratroopers but somebody will shortly, … I have a right as a representative in this
house who is an eyewitness to ask a question of that of a murdering hypocrite” (Coogan,
1997:136). Taoiseach of the Republic of Ireland Jack Lynch issued an immediate statement of
disapproval (to put it lightly), echoing the feelings of Nationalists across the Island of Ireland.
The statement read:
…I’m appalled and stunned that British soldiers should shoot indiscriminately into a crowd
of peacefully demonstrating civilians, resulting in the deaths of (ten) young men [Lynch
had been misinformed of the total number of casualties at the time he released the
statement.] (Lynch, Statement Following Bloody Sunday, Jan 30st, 1972).
Newspapers
Newspapers were quick to release reports of the events of Bloody Sunday, many of
which included eyewitness accounts and personal testimonies. The following are excerpts from
two separate reports on Bloody Sunday, one by Simon Winchester of The Guardian, a UK-based
publication. The other report is by Dick Grogan and Martin Crowley of The Irish Times. Both
excerpts are from the January 31st edition of their respective papers and unilaterally deplore the
actions of British troops but also acknowledge the presence of potential nationalist paramilitary
involvement, highlighting heightened tensions in Northern Ireland that had been lingering since
the outset of the 1969 riots some three years earlier.
Upon immediate examination of both papers, the most striking difference to me is the
leading headline of both papers. The Guardian, a British paper leads with “13 KILLED AS
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PARATROOPS BREAK RIOT.” (The Guardian, January 31st, 1972) At first glance, word
selection is already readily apparent in framing the Winchester story. Despite the fact that
Winchester’s piece does not seem to be slanted in either direction, when compared with the
leading headline of Irish Times story “SOLDIERS KILL 13 IN BOGSIDE” (Irish Times,
January 31st, 1972), Winchester’s headline does, in fact, frame the story differently. By using the
words “break riot” The Guardian implants an initial impression that the British army was acting,
though recklessly, in line with their orders—after all the civil rights march had been deemed
illegal by Stormont. It must be made clear however, that the content of Winchester’s article does
not appear to be biased in anyway towards either side, merely projecting the events of the day as
he felt they unfolded. Instead, it is the initial wording of the headline that shines a more
favorable light on the British army.
Both newspapers project a general feeling of disapproval of the actions by British
soldiers. Next to Grogan and Crowley’s article is a short blurb titled “The Sharpeville Massacre.”
This piece, while not explicitly calling Bloody Sunday a massacre, describes the events of two
prominent massacres of the twentieth century, Apartheid South Africa’s Sharpeville Massacre in
1960 and India’s Amritsar Massacre in 1919. These two events dramatically altered the course of
civil rights movements in South Africa and India, and both are commonly referenced as turning
points in conflict. Winchester goes as far to mention Sharpeville in his story, marking that “the
streets had all the appearance of the aftermath of a Sharpeville.”
Regardless of their intention, official statements by government officials and legal
investigators, television reports, radio broadcasts, photographs, and newspapers were integral in
shaping public opinion of the events of Bloody Sunday. For many previously politically neutral
or apathetic individuals, Bloody Sunday was a polarizing event. For those already firmly
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entrenched in either encampment of the nascent Troubles, initial reports by the media,
government officials, and subsequently released legal inquiries simply fomented an already
blatant political divide between Nationalists and Unionists as well as Catholics and Protestants,
further fueling escalation of paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland.
Academic
By implementing a policy of Internment, the government of Northern Ireland drew heavy
criticism from its Nationalist population. While the outwardly stated goal of Internment was to
combat a growing trend of paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland that had been steadily
increasing since the late 1960s (Hennessey, 1997:193), the reality of Internment was quite
different. Aside from the questionable authority it gave the RUC to raid nationalist (although
Coogan 1997, notes that this essentially meant Catholic) homes at all hours of the day, it also
enabled law enforcement officials to hold prisoners for an extended period of time without trial.
In addition to implementing Internment, Brian Faulkner, then Prime Minister of Northern
Ireland, had announced heightened security measures that gave British troops and RUC members
special authoritative powers. As the civil rights march that took place on Bloody Sunday was
expected to go on as planned (despite its illegal nature), British troops and law enforcement
officials were dispatched to the area in droves, armed with both rubber and lead bullets, the stage
was set for what would be arguably the most divisive day of in the thirty year history of The
Troubles.
Internment and Bloody Sunday
The riots of 1969 proved that Nationalists and Unionists were clearly at odds, divided
along the lines of religious affiliation and political ideology. Already underrepresented in
Stormont, Catholics found themselves being unfairly targeted during midnight arrest raids geared
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at arresting and interning (without trial) Republican paramilitaries. Robin Evelegh, former
Colonel in the British Army and author of Peace-keeping in a Democratic Society: Lessons from
Northern Ireland, describes the social and psychological impact of these raids on the catholic
community in Northern Ireland, explaining that “… a mother who has had soldiers breaking up
her home and incidentally terrifying her children at 3 am is unlikely to wish to help the
government” (Evelegh, 1978:70). These raids were not entirely uncommon either, as Faulkner’s
Internment policy led to 17,262 home searches and or raids in 1971 alone” (Lee, 1989:433). The
raids were relatively unfruitful in achieving their established aims, according to Lee (1989), as
much of the information used by the British military and the RUC was speculative at best. One
thing these raids were incredibly effective at was antagonizing a Catholic population.
Consequently, enraged Nationalist paramilitary organizations escalated their armed campaign
following the implementation of Internment in August of 1971. While the total number of
Troubles-related casualties in 1971 prior to the beginning of Internment on August 9th is 32, 154
people were killed during the remaining months of the year (Fay, 1999:136). In the midst of the
violence, calls for civil rights became louder and more unified. Even the more pragmatic,
progressive of the Nationalist parties in Northern Ireland, the Social Democratic Labor Party
(SDLP), called for Catholics to remove themselves from public life in protest of Internment.
Civil rights protesters began organizing a march in Derry to voice their opposition to
Internment. The date was set for January 30th, 1972. By sunset on January 30th in Derry
numerous civilians were injured, thirteen were dead and a fourteenth would die several months
later, all killed by British Paratroopers. Much of Bloody Sunday’s history revolves around the
events of the day and the subsequent sociopolitical implications of what many viewed as a stateorchestrated massacre.
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Lee’s (1989) discussion of Bloody Sunday offers a somewhat slanted view of the events
of the day. He discusses Bloody Sunday and the subsequent fallout of January 30th 1972 under
the subheading “The Fall of Stormont.” Lee’s analysis places the blame squarely on the
shoulders of the British Army. Since the beginning of Operation Demetrius, all marches were
banned in Northern Ireland. However, Lee highlights the impotency of this policy, stating that
the civil rights march on January 30th was “yet another illegal march, like all marches since 9
August” (p.440). Despite this, other civil rights marches had gone on without incident since
August, “including five in January” (p.440). To Lee, the marching ban was all bark and no bite
until Bloody Sunday. He makes few concessions in the defense of British soldiers, whom he
believes acted entirely out of line in carrying out pointless arrests as the march was dispersing.
Furthermore, he argues that neither the RUC nor the British army acted in accordance with this
marching ban, failing to prevent it from happening in the first place. Sardonically mocking the
British Paratroopers, Lee interrupts his history and injects a bit of literature by Nobel Laureate
Seamus Heaney, “PARAS THIRTEEN, the wall said, BOGSIDE NIL” (Heaney, 1979:22 as
cited in Lee, 1989:440). Perhaps in an effort to further acknowledge his own opinions in his
writing, Lee frequently makes reference to both Nationalist and Loyalist belligerents scoring
‘kills’ over the course of The Troubles. Juxtaposing Heaney’s sport allusion with a short critique
of what he clearly feels to be a massacre committed by British soldiers, Lee explains, “…the
professionals gave an amateur performance”(441). In giving this performance, the British Army
made drastically worse the problem they were brought to Northern Ireland to mitigate.
Hennessey’s (1997) history of Northern Ireland echoes Lee (1989) in that it frames
Bloody Sunday as an aspect of The Troubles that led to the imposition of Direct Rule. Yet it
differs in that it presents a much more neutral tone than Lee’s. As a traditionally articulated
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history, Hennessey’s explanation offers little content that might sway readers. His summary of
the events of Bloody Sunday is relatively straightforward and uncontroversial. Hennessey states
that “the shooting began…when part of the crowd tried to climb over a street barrier and were
forced back by the British army using rubber bullets and spray from a water cannon,” but, he
posits, “… it was never established who fired the first shots” (p.206). Other than referring to
Bernadette Devlin expressing her outrage in the British House of Commons, Hennessey does
little to underscore just how “[t]he events of Bloody Sunday created a wave of anger throughout
the Catholic community” (p.206). A paragraph later, Hennessey proceeds to the subsequent
months after Bloody Sunday, arguing that they “were to be no less violent” (p.206). Then, he
quickly moves on to the suspension of the Stormont Parliament for one year. Hennessey’s scant
explanation of Bloody Sunday is somewhat explained by the fact that his book attempts to pack
seventy-six years of history in Northern Ireland into approximately three-hundred pages, but
nonetheless offers little in terms of analysis.
In This Troubled Land, Rucker (2002) uses a hybridized form of historical analysis, using
first hand recollections, personal anecdotes and somewhat ambiguous back-stories to explain the
impact of the events of Bloody Sunday. Rucker’s history diverges from Lee and Hennessey
primarily in style of delivery, as well as overall aim. If placed on a spectrum, Widgery’s Inquiry
would be on the Unionist end, Lee’s would be found towards the Nationalist terminal and
Hennessey’s would be somewhere in the middle. Rucker’s, however, would be found across the
spectrum, as he attempts to provide the rationale for all sides involved. Rucker also provides
individual background stories to better illustrate the sentiments of Nationalists in the Bogside in
the months following Internment and preceding Bloody Sunday. Rucker uses the same tactic to
underscore the perspective of the Paratroopers, specifically an unnamed Para he calls Private
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027, who discusses in detail pervasive attitudes among British troops deployed in Northern
Ireland. As if he had collaborated with Lee, Private 027, frequently mentions an inexplicable
desire to see combat and achieve “kills” during his time in Northern Ireland. Rucker makes no
attempt to justify the actions of the 1st Battalion of British Paratroopers, but he provides
extensive evidence that better explains their mindset heading into the civil rights march that
became Bloody Sunday.
In reference to the controversial Widgery Report, Rucker argues that, at the time, “…the
Widgery report was the final word on Bloody Sunday and hung over Catholics like a badge of
ignominy” (Rucker, 2002:96). However, the inaccuracy of Widgery’s report is likely due to its
hastened release, as well as the relatively contentious political environment it aimed to address.
Rucker’s interview with Bloody Sunday eye-witness Leo Young tells us that “‘Widgery was an
arrogant, cheeky bastard. He did not want to know nothing, he only wanted to get the whole
thing through” (p.135). Expressing outrage at this, Young continues, “… I had to get my
thoughts across [during the inquiry]… there was no way… they dismissed me as insignificant”
(p. 135). As for Private 027, his opinion of the Widgery report was nearly as skeptical, though
for his own sake he decided not to stir the pot. Rucker writes:
…Private 027 had planned to tell the truth, or as much as he could without implicating his
colleagues. But when he described indiscriminate shooting towards the barricade, the
lawyer stood up from his chair and looked down at the private with surprise. ‘We can’t
have that, can we, Private? he asked. ‘That makes it sound as if shots were fired into the
crowd’ (p. 135).
As Private 027 illustrates, Rucker’s interest lies not in the primary actors involved in Bloody
Sunday (like Young and Private 027), but instead in the sociopolitical constraints that generated
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an environment conducive to producing an atrocity like Bloody Sunday. Rucker’s history is
valuable in that it attempts to provide perspective and context for events preceding, during, and
after Bloody Sunday.
Synthesis
While the deeply divided nature of Northern Ireland was made painfully obvious by the
turmoil of 1969, Internment and Bloody Sunday exposed just how easily human malignancy can
blow a conflict wide open. By examining primary accounts and historical depictions of
Internment and Bloody Sunday through a lens of conflict theory, we can better understand how
The Troubles further worsened due to a range of political, social, and environmental instigators.
As we have already established, Internment, supposedly implemented to combat rising
paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland, was ineffective at carrying out its original goals.
Instead, Internment took an already uneasy population of Catholics, and put them further at odds
with the three institutions that were theoretically supposed to protect them: the Government of
Northern Ireland (Stormont), security forces (the RUC), the military (the British Army). The
anger and tension generated by Internment contributed greatly to creating an environment of fear
and uncertainty in Northern Ireland that transcended political allegiance. As a result, when civil
rights protesters in Derry staged their march on January 30th, 1972, shots fired by British
paratroopers broke the conflict wide open.
Bloody Sunday represents a catastrophic step backwards in the path towards conflict
reconciliation. In terms of polarizing effects on the population of Northern Ireland, if the riots of
1969 were a thunderstorm, Bloody Sunday was a category five hurricane. The shootings and
ensuing political controversy radicalized throngs of previously apathetic Nationalists and
Unionists. Appalled Nationalists, already having lost faith in Stormont and the RUC, and now
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the supposedly neutral British Army, turned to paramilitary groups like the IRA and began to
embrace them. Former Nationalist MP, Bernadette Devlin, who was heavily involved in both the
1969 riots and Bloody Sunday, offered the following statement in retrospect, which perhaps best
sums up the lasting impact of Bloody Sunday,
…The key impact of Bloody Sunday was that a whole generation made a similar analysis
and this fuelled some 25 years of violent political conflict, at least tolerated by the majority
of the "minority population" and actively pursued by a significant but sustainable minority.
It is responsibility for this legacy that sets Bloody Sunday apart from subsequent atrocities
on all sides. (The Guardian, June 15th, 2010).
4.2 Escalation and the Long War: “Negative, Destructive,” Conflict. (1972-1987)
Introduction
The fallout of Bloody Sunday in 1972 was dramatic. In the months and years after,
Northern Ireland’s Troubles escalated from small-scale political upheaval to an international,
cross-border conflict that took countless lives. Section 4.2, “Escalation and the Long War:
Negative, Destructive, Conflict,” is devoted to an analysis of the development of “negative
destructive conflict” in Northern Ireland over a span of fifteen years. The Bergof Foundation’s
definition of Conflict Transformation posits that the purpose of Conflict Transformation is to
“transform negative, destructive conflict into positive constructive conflict” (“Bergof
Foundation” on Conflict Transformation, October, 2011). Before analyzing how and why The
Troubles were transformed into positive, constructive, conflict, it is necessary to understand the
how and why that made them incredibly negative and destructive. This period of “negative,
destructive conflict” during The Troubles is known as ‘Escalation.’ In this time, paramilitary
membership and activity were at all-time highs, and so were sectarian killings. Additionally, I
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will highlight the mechanics of negative, destructive, conflict by examining the following five
key paramilitary attacks that occurred between 1972 and 1987:
4.2a. Bloody Friday (1972)
4.2b. Dublin and Monaghan Bombings (1974)
4.2c. Warrenpoint Ambush and Mountbatten Assassination (1979)
4.2d. Brighton Hotel Bombing (1984)
4.2e. Enniskillen Bombing (1987)
But first, it is important to establish criteria for what “Negative, Destructive, Conflict” really is.
According to Augsberger (1992), “a conflict is destructive—has destructive consequences—if
the participants are dissatisfied with the outcomes and all feel they have lost as a result of the
conflict” (Augsberger, 1992:47). Augsberger acknowledges that his assertion is essentially a
value-laden judgment, but it can readily be applied to conflict. This is because conflicts, at their
core, are value-laden interactions, with one party’s values conflicting with an opposition’s
values. The righteousness of these values is unimportant, as evidenced by the atrocious actions of
Loyalist and Nationalist paramilitaries during The Troubles.
Paramilitary organizations may have often felt satisfaction following a strategic victory
such as a successful ambush or a massive bombing, their stated desires were rarely if ever were
satisfied by concessions from the political realm. In other words, their violent actions rarely, if
ever, contributed to the achievement of their political goals. If paramilitary organizations were
ever truly satisfied with the results of their violent campaign, they would not have a reason to
conflict, unless they were anarchists (though some might go so far as to argue this point).
Expanding his analysis of destructive conflict, Augsberger (1992) argues,
…[d]estructive

conflict is also characterized by four tendencies. In this case, the individuals

or groups tend to: (1) expand the number of issues, participants, negative attitudes, and
self-justifications. (2) Emancipate the conflict from its initiating causes so it can continue
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after these are irrelevant or forgotten; (3) escalate into strategies of power tactics of threat,
coercion and deception; and (4) polarize into uniform opinions behind single-minded and
militant leadership (p.47).
During the protracted violence of the 1970s and 1980s, these four tendencies played out quite
visibly in the form of paramilitary escalation. As a result, violence of The Troubles spilled over
the border of Northern Ireland into the Republic of Ireland and England.
4.2a. Bloody Friday (1972)
On July 21st 1972, twenty-two bombs rattled Belfast, killing eleven people and injuring
130. The bombs were planted by the Provisional Irish Republican Army, or ‘Provos,’ as a part of
their military action plan (now called the Long War) to rid Northern Ireland of British rule. With
the PIRA growing at a staggering rate following the atrocities of Bloody Sunday several months
earlier and their demands not being met by the British Government, the PIRA felt it was time to
mount a massive offensive against what they perceived to be an oppressive and violent British
presence in Northern Ireland. While the PIRA gave numerous warnings as to the locations of the
bombs shortly beforehand, they also gave hoax warnings, which generated tremendous confusion
among security personnel and civilians. Over the next hour and a half, bombs exploded
throughout Belfast, and many began subscribing to the notion that PIRA had officially
discredited itself as a viable political entity by saturating itself in a campaign of excessive
political violence. In an effort to quash further similar attacks, the British Government
implemented Operation Motorman, designed forcibly retake control of Nationalist paramilitary
controlled no-go areas in predominantly Catholic areas of Belfast and Derry. Bloody Friday,
much like Bloody Sunday, further drew in individuals to both sides of the conflict, and is
consistent with Augsberger’s assertion that negative conflict “expand[s] the number of issues,
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participants, negative attitudes, and self-justifications” (Augsberger, 1992:47) in a given setting
of conflict.
Primary
Irish Times
The Irish Times published a series of stories in the days following the bombings, but
perhaps the most valuable sources are the headlines from the day after Bloody Friday, July 22,
1972. Choosing to focus on the aftermath of the bombings as opposed to the bombings
themselves, the Irish Times led with “GUNBATTLES FOLLOW BOMBING WAVE. MORE
TROOPS BROUGHT IN TO SEAL WHOLE AREAS OF BELFAST” (Irish Times, July 22,
1972). The second-most prominent headline for the day described the bombings in detail
however, reading in large print: “PROVISIONALS ADMIT RESPONSIBILITY FOR DAY OF
TERROR”(Irish Times, July 22, 1972). The vast majority of this article is devoted to painting an
image of the day’s events. It includes a statement released by the PIRA, which reads:
We accept full responsibility for all explosions in the Belfast area today. In accepting
responsibility we point out that the following organizations were informed of bomb positions at
least 30 minutes to one hour before each explosion—the Samaritans, the Public protection
agency, the rumour service, and press.
The Irish Times makes no qualms about expressing the vulgarity of the attack, citing
“scenes of panic, horror, and confusion” and the presence of “unanimous condemnation”
specifically criticizing the PIRA’s decision to release numerous hoax warnings, which
severely undermined efforts of security personnel and the public to mitigate the looming
damage.
London Times
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While the Irish Times chose to lead with a story about British crackdown in Northern
Ireland following the Bloody Friday, the London Times bluntly led with “ELEVEN DIE, 130
ARE INJURED AFTER BOMBS EXPLODE ALL OVER BELFAST” (London Times, July 22,
1972). The details that surface in this article are much more unnerving than those in the Irish
Times. The article lambasts the PIRA and then describes the bombings of the day as “their most
savage and ruthless bombing attack in Belfast” with “pieces of flesh and broken bones, bearing
no resemblance to the human body, [lying] on the road.” Echoing the Irish Times however, this
story describes the general chaos that filled Belfast during and after the bombings. The concerns
of Protestants are also voiced who claimed that if the British Army did not take action “…the
majority community might take the law into their own hands.” Furthermore, the article forecasts
a rapid military escalation “against the IRA inside Catholic housing estates.”
Academic
The general attitude toward Bloody Friday in historical texts generally mirrors that of the
newspapers in the Republic of Ireland and England on July 22, 1972. Lee, Taylor, and Hennessy
all draw similar conclusions from the bombings of Bloody Friday in that they feel they were
integral in further distancing Nationalists and Unionists from one another. First, that the
warnings given by the PIRA were “hopelessly inadequate” (Taylor, 1998:150). Second, that the
images displayed on television depicting the aftermath of the bombing were a testament to the
horrific nature of these bombings (Both Hennessey, 1997:212 and Taylor, 1998:149 note
television coverage). Lee returns to his sardonic use of ‘score’ once more, stating that the “PIRA
scored eleven kills and wounded another 130, many maimed for life.” (Lee 1989, 442.) Several
other historical texts offer virtually the same chronology and content of the events of Bloody
Friday, offering little more than a paragraph on the subject before moving on to the next event.
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The academic consensus on Bloody Friday was that it was simply another event in the somber
historical timeline of The Troubles in Northern Ireland.
Synthesis
It is my assertion that understanding Bloody Friday is integral to locating social,
religious, and political attitudes in Northern Ireland, the greater United Kingdom, and the
Republic of Ireland on the timeline of Conflict Transformation. Without question, both primary
documents and academic discourse attempt to highlight the disturbing nature of the Bloody
Friday bombings. However, the difference between leading headlines of the Irish Times and
London Times is indicative of the way cultural and political biases framed violence during the
early 1970s of The Troubles. The Irish Times’ decision to lead with the subsequent crackdown
by the British Army following the Bloody Friday bombings is curious as neither headline
directly involves violence in the Republic of Ireland. Whether intentional or not, the decision to
display the violence that took place after the Bloody Friday Bombings more prominently than
the incredibly violent bombings itself places symbolic importance on post-bombing violence. In
doing so, this detracts from the illaudable actions of an unapologetic PIRA who had just blown
11 individuals to bits in Belfast and places the emphasis on the reactionary violence of the
British Army and RUC.
Furthermore, the actions of the PIRA on Bloody Friday are in line with Augsberger’s
‘first tendency’ in negative conflict, which is to “expand the number of issues, participants,
negative attitudes, and self-justifications [for conflict]” (Augsberger, 1992 p.47). As PIRA
membership grew in Northern Ireland, violence increased. Short-lived cease-fires were broken
repeatedly by the PIRA because they claimed the British Government refused to acknowledge
the validity of their demands. The breakout of bombings in Belfast on July 21st, 1972 was not
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simply another penny in the jar of paramilitary violence. Instead Bloody Friday marked a
transition to escalation in Northern Ireland—a transition to negative, destructive, conflict.
4.2b Dublin and Monaghan Bombings (1974)
May 17th 1974 marked another devastating escalation of the conflict in Northern Ireland,
as violence spilled over the border into the town of Monaghan and the Irish capital, Dublin. The
bombings occurred round 5:30 pm on a Friday—rush hour. In total, 33 people died and
approximately 300 were injured. The fact that there were no warnings given before the blasts is
likely a major contributing factor in the incredibly high casualty total. The Dublin and Monaghan
bombings were a direct attempt by loyalist paramilitaries to escalate The Troubles. This is made
evident by Loyalist paramilitaries who, according to UDA spokesperson Sammy Smyth, now felt
they were at “war with the free state” (UDA Response to Dublin and Monaghan bombings,
1974). By bombing civilian targets in the Republic of Ireland, it is clear that Loyalist
paramilitaries were trying to “…emancipate the conflict from its initiating causes so it can
continue after these are irrelevant or forgotten” (Augsberger 1992 p. 47).
Primary Sources
Irish Times
The Irish Times unsurprisingly expressed disgust over the incidents, leading with the
headline “28 KILLED, OVER 100 INJURED IN BOMB BLASTS IN DUBLIN,
MONAGHAN” with a subscript reading “Many women, children among victims; nationwide
alert on danger of further bombs” (Irish Times, May 18, 1974).The article also mentions that no
warnings were given before the bombs exploded and then goes on to cite Irish Taoiseach Liam
Cosgrave who issued a formal statement on the matter:
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…what has happened today will help to underline the criminal folly and utter futility of
violent action as a means for furthering political ends. It will also help to bring home to us
here, in this part of our island, what the people of Northern Ireland have been suffering for
five long years. Today’s evil deeds will only serve to strengthen the resolve of those, North
and South, who have been working for peace.
The article proceeds to acknowledge that all main paramilitary organizations have either denied
responsibility for (UDA and UVF) or condemned (PIRA) the bombings.
London Times
The London Times headline for May 18th was quite similar to that of the Irish Times,
reading: “28 KILLED, HUNDREDS HURT BY EIRE CAR BOMBS: RUSH HOUR
DEVASTATION IN CENTRAL DUBLIN” (London Times, May 18th, 1974). The article makes
note of the fact that both the PIRA and UDA denied responsibility for the bombing. This article
also focuses on the general confusion that plagued Dublin and Monaghan after the bombings,
claiming, “people were running and screaming aimlessly.” The second-leading story discusses
the political response by both Northern Irish officials as well as the Republic’s government. This
article does, however, make mention of the PIRA’s insistence that the bombings were “an SAStype operation,” in other words, a product of British collusion. The London Times employs Chief
Executive Faulkner’s response to the bombings, quoting “whatever the differences of opinion
which may exist on other matters, I believe the responsible people in Northern Ireland and the
Republic alike want to see this island rid forever of the evil forces which are guilty of such acts”
(London Times, May 18th, 1974).
Academic
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The Dublin and Monaghan bombings are especially interesting in a historical context
because they play a large role in the history both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. In
purely academic works like Hennessey and Lee, the Dublin and Monaghan bombings are framed
under the fallout of the Ulster Worker’s council strike and the subsequent collapse of the
Sunningdale agreement (this will be discussed in section 4.4). Lee and Hennessey present the
attacks as a knee jerk reaction by loyalist paramilitaries to the impotent cross-border Council of
Ireland (which gave the Republic say in matters such as cultural preservation, tourism and
agriculture). Both Coogan (1987) and Taylor (1998) cast doubts as to any collusion by the
British Government in either bombing, but Coogan goes as far as saying the Dublin and
Monaghan Bombings were the “Republic’s Bloody Friday” (Coogan, 1987:26). This is true
insofar as it raised paranoia and increased the vigilance of security forces on both sides of the
border.
Synthesis
The real impact of the Dublin and Monaghan bombings is open to interpretation, but for
the purposes of this thesis, these bombings are best historically understood when contextualized
in Augsberger’s four qualities of negative conflict. As I have outlined, Augsberger posits that
actors in negative, destructive conflict seek to escalate the conflict to a point where its initiating
causes become irrelevant, thus allowing it to continue indefinitely (Augsberger, 1992: 47). The
Dublin and Monaghan bombings did exactly this. While many in the Republic of Ireland had
opinions on the conflict in Northern Ireland, the majority did little to influence it one way or
another. Newspapers in the Republic of Ireland and England recorded the terror of the days’
events, helping external observers generate their own political opinions as such. If the goal of
Loyalist paramilitaries was to rid the North of Republican Governmental cooperation (the
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Council of Ireland) as Lee (1989) and Hennessey (1997) suggest, logic dictates that they would
not bomb its unaffiliated civilians in the Republic—a move that would seemingly draw the
Republic of Ireland further into the conflict. A slough of bombings directed at non-military
targets, later owned up to by Loyalist paramilitaries, is an example of negative conflict
escalation. It attempted to expand the conflict to something it physically wasn’t—what UDA
spokesperson Sammy Smyth called a “War with the Free State.” It again conjured up feelings of
anti-British sentiment across the island of Ireland and further stoked the flames of the IRA’s
Long War, escalating the conflict to new levels of violence.
4.2c Warrenpoint Ambush and Mountbatten Assassination (1979)
August 27th 1979 was one of the most costly days for the British military in Northern
Ireland but was simultaneously one of the most “successful” days for the PIRA in the history of
The Troubles. PIRA regiments carried out two successful attacks. The first was the assassination
of Lord Mountbatten, former Admiral of the Fleet in the British Royal Navy, in Sligo, Republic
of Ireland. The second was a PIRA ambush on British troops at Warrenpoint, which took the
lives of 18 British soldiers. Viewed as two major victories for the PIRA and their Long War,
these two events caused the British Government to seriously reconsider their intelligence strategy
in regards to a PIRA that, to return to Augsberger, was now clearly making use of their dubious
ability to use threat, coercion, and deception to inflict harm and thrive in an atypical war.
Primary
Irish Times
The day after the Warrenpoint and Mountbatten attacks, the Irish Times led with “BOMB
ON BOAT KILLS LORD MOUNTBATTEN” (Irish Times, August 28, 1979). The article notes
PIRA responsibility and underscores growing international demands for peace and an end to
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violence in Northern Ireland. Irish Minister for Justice Mr. Gerry Collins voiced his concerns
stating that the Government of the Republic of Ireland’s reaction is “one of revulsion and deep
shock” and that “any changes which might be necessary to deal with terrorist would be
considered by the government.” Furthermore, Collins expressed his “hope that this incident
would have no impact on Anglo-Irish relations.” The second most prominent article on the front
page of the Irish Times details the Warrenpoint Ambush. The PIRA’s claim of responsibility is
again included, with a transcript of an official statement by PIRA leaders saying they “‘admit
responsibility… for landmine explosions’ and would continue their campaign until there was ‘a
declaration by Britain of intent to withdraw from the North’”(Irish Times, August 28, 1979).
London Times
There was a suspension of operations for the London Times for nearly a year (December
1, 1978 to November 12, 1979) due to a labor dispute. As a result, there was no newspaper
published immediately following the PIRA attacks of August 27th, 1979. When the paper
returned in mid-November of that same year, it published a News Review of the events that
occurred during the work stoppage. The news review contained an article with titled
“GROWING AUDACITY OF IRA ATTACKS BLIGHTS HOPE OF BRINGING ULSTER
CLOSER TO PEACE” (London Times, November 14, 1979). Above the title is a smaller
headliner that announces “TERRORISTS BECOMING MORE PROFESSIONAL AND LESS
VULNERABLE.” The article describes the bombing assassination of Mountbatten in Sligo as
well as the ambush bombing of British troops at Warrenpoint as “terrorist coups” which
“precipitated a hurried review of … security policies and in particular [inter-governmental]
cooperation in the area of border” (London Times, November 14, 1979).
Academic
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Both the assassination of Lord Mountbatten and the ambush killing of 18 British Soldiers
at Warrenpoint are looked upon as major contributing factors to the growth and support of Sinn
Fein. Furthermore, Lee argues that Mountbatten’s death and the Warrenpoint Ambush directly
influenced perceptions of the PIRA (Lee 1989:455), giving them more credibility as a legitimate
politically minded military entity amongst Nationalists. Coogan lends credence to the notion that
the heavy military loss inflicted by the PIRA at Warrenpoint, was far more important to rallying
Nationalist support than what was perceived by many as a merely symbolic assassination of Lord
Mountbatten. But according to Alfred McClung-Lee’s Terrorism in Northern Ireland (1983), the
celebrity status of Lord Mountbatten as well as the tactical superiority displayed by the IRA at
Warrenpoint made August 27th simply an all-around major “victory” for the PIRA (p.188). PIRA
leadership thought the attacks, especially Warrenpoint, would demoralize British troops.
However, the effect the events of August 27th actually generated, however, was quite the
opposite. Increased security and surveillance were added to an already massive laundry list of
day-to-day conflict management policies in Northern Ireland and the Republic Ireland.
Synthesis
The events of August 27th, 1979 had both symbolic and concrete political consequences.
Mountbatten’s assassination and the Warrenpoint ambush highlighted that the British
Government was dealing with a very real foe, not simply a disorganized paramilitary opponent.
The decisive PIRA victory at Warrenpoint displays that they were well versed in combat
operations and were not to be taken lightly. In essence Warrenpoint showed that the PIRA had
adapted to the constraints of the given conflict, characterized by their inability to wage a fullscale traditional military engagement, to create a viable, destructive action plan through the use
of threat, coercion, and deception (Augsberger’s 3rd tendency of negative, destructive conflict).
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This adaptation further involved both sides in the conflict, as intelligence and security in the
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland had to be reexamined and fortified in order to
counteract escalating paramilitary violence.
4.2d Brighton Hotel Bombing (1984)
In an audacious attempt to assassinate Margaret Thatcher and her entire cabinet on
October 12th, 1984, PIRA militants bombed the Grand Hotel in Brighton, England where
Thatcher and her cabinet were staying for the 1984 Conservative Party Conference. Neither
Thatcher nor any member of her cabinet was harmed in the blast that killed five individuals and
injured upwards of thirty. The PIRA claimed responsibility and expressed no remorse. The attack
was representative of the ultimate struggle of Republican paramilitaries—a small, but powerful
group (the PIRA) waging war against a seemingly insurmountable opponent (the “interfering”
British Government). This direct attack on the British Government by the PIRA exemplifies
Augsberger’s fourth tendency, which argues that conflicting groups (in this case the PIRA) are
“polarized into uniform opinions behind a single minded and militant leadership” (Augsberger
1992, 47).
Primary
Irish Times
The Irish Times made it a point to convey the destruction that was caused by the previous
days bombings, leading with: “Thatcher escapes death by minutes: FOUR KILLED AS IRA
BOMB BRIGHTON HOTEL.” Mentioned is the fact that this was a no-warning blast that
appeared to be an “IRA mass assassination attempt on the British cabinet [which] demolished
part of the Grand Hotel.” The remorseless PIRA issued a statement that was run in the paper. It
read:
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The IRA claims responsibility for the detonation of 100lb of gelignite in Brighton against
the British Cabinet and Tory Warmongers. Mrs. Thatcher will now realize that Britain
cannot occupy our country and torture our prisoners and shoot our people on their own
streets and get away with it. Today we were unlucky, but remember, we only have to be
lucky once—you will have to be lucky always. Give Ireland peace and there will be no
war.
The article describes a response by Thatcher in which she called the attack “inhuman,” a
statement that echoed widespread international condemnation of PIRA actions. (Irish Times,
October 13, 1984).
London Times
The London Times went with a somewhat bolder headline, titled: “THATCHER DEFIES
IRA BOMBERS.” Which describes how the British Prime Minister kept her cool and maintained
firm opposition to the use of paramilitary violence as a means of achieving political gains within
the United Kingdom. The article does however note that Thatcher was somewhat surprised that
she was targeted by the PIRA, stating, “you read about these things happening, but you never
believe it will happen to you” (London Times, October 13, 1984).
Academic
The Brighton Bombing is similar to the Mountbatten Assassination and Warrenpoint
Ambush as they were viewed as ‘spectacular’ acts of violence. Small-scale, local PIRA attacks
were slowly being replaced by large scale ones in what seemed to be an attempt to generate
attention and support for their cause. In fact, in an examination of several historical texts, the
word ‘spectacular’ is used in most all descriptions of the Brighton Hotel Bombing, including
Coogan (1987), Lee (1989), Hennessey (1997), and Fay (1999). Exemplifying the IRA’s struggle
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to be perceived as a legitimate opponent, Fay (1999) makes the point that “the IRA was
convinced that ‘spectaculars’ outside Northern Ireland, typified by the Brighton Bombing, an
attempt to kill the entire British Cabinet, would be more productive than local violence” (p.154).
Despite this, the PIRA made very few attempts to bolster their credibility to suppor their political
wing, as the revolving door between PIRA hierarchy and Sinn Fein remained painfully obvious.
Hennessey (1997) supports this conclusion arguing, that the “Brighton Bombing reiterated that,
despite the recent electoral success of the IRA’s political wing, Sinn Fein, the armed campaign
still held priority” (p.263).
Synthesis
Augsberger’s fourth tendency, when applied to the Brighton Bombing, explains why the
conflict began to enter a period of stalemate. While paramilitary violence continued on either
side, the frequency and intensity at which it occurred began to stabilize (see Brahm’s chart at the
beginning of chapter 4). While the PIRA was united behind “single-minded and militant
leadership” (Augsberger 1992, p.47), so was the opposition. Thatcher’s militant opposition to
terrorist activity (as made famous by her assertion that there is no such thing as political
violence), made it clear that the single-minded opposition of the PIRA and their Long War would
accomplish little in cracking Unionist hegemony, pushing forward the idea that an armed
campaign was a no-win strategy. As the 1980s pressed on, it became clear that the PIRA’s
violent tactics appealed to radical Nationalists, not a more moderate Nationalist crowd that
subscribed to a more pragmatic, water-on-stone school of political change. And while the armed
campaign continued for some years on, it began to dissipate after the Enniskillen Bombing in
1987.
4.2e The Enniskillen Bombing (1987)
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As the tumult of the 1980s wore on, attitudes toward paramilitary violence became
increasingly negative. People were growing tired of hearing about the same violence on the news
day in, day out, with little or no progress to discuss in the political arena. While there is no set
point as to when The Troubles began to turn in the favor of peaceful progress, a bombing during
a November 8th, 1987 Remembrance Day parade in Enniskillen deeply shook Northern Ireland.
In total, twelve individuals were killed. Among the initial dead was one RUC officer and ten
civilians. A final casualty occurred thirteen years later in 2000, when a victim passed away after
being in a coma since the bombing. The fact that it was mostly civilian deaths and injuries was
devastating for individuals on both sides of the conflict. As a result, the PIRA in Fermanagh was
dismantled and PIRA higher-ups found themselves reconsidering their armed campaign. While
numerous bombings occurred the following decade, the late 1980s and 1990s were
predominantly characterized by a major campaign for peace.
Primary
Irish Times
The Enniskillen Bombing made front-page news in the Irish Times with the headline
reading: “11 CIVILIANS KILLED IN ENNISKILLEN WAR MEMORIAL BOMBING.” The
article asserts, “the bomb, which caused carnage among a crowd assembling for a Remembrance
Day ceremony in Enniskillen, was intended to kill civilians, the RUC Chief Constable, Sir John
Hermon, said last night.” Among the injured were children as young as two years old, and one
child lost both parents in the blast. The article continues to highlight the damaging effects this
bombing was bound to cause, quoting Northern Ireland Secretary Mr. Tom King, who called the
bombing “a scar on the face of the whole island of Ireland.” Mr King continues, “…it is difficult
to conceive a more callous and appalling outrage than has been committed here today… In any
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civilized society there is no place for people who can commit outrages of this kind” and that the
perpetrators had a “depraved mentality.” (Irish Times, November 9th, 1987)
London Times
The London Times highlights that the Enniskillen Bombing was a major blunder on the
part of the PIRA. The headline read “11 DIE IN POPPY DAY MASSACRE:
CONDEMNATION FOR IRA BOMB AT ULSTER WAR MEMORIAL.” As it had in the past,
the London Times highlighted that the bomb exploded without warning, but this time it went
further, stating “the outrage was immediately condemned by leaders in Britain, the Irish
Republic, and around the world as the most disgusting ever perpetrated by the IRA.” This article
also offers substantial clues as to how the tide was turning against the PIRA in The Troubles,
explaining:
Yesterday's explosion was clearly a retaliation by the Provisional IRA, which has suffered
a series of setbacks to its terrorist campaign this year. The most notable reversal came in
April when eight of its members were killed in a shoot-out with security forces at
Loughgall, Co Armagh. More recently one of the top IRA bomb makers, Gerald McNamee,
was convicted at the Central Court and was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment.
(The London Times, November 9th, 1987)
Academic
The abhorrence expressed in both Times stories is reflected in historical texts. Both
Hennessey (1997) and Fay (1999) point to the Enniskillen Bombing as a turning point for
Republican paramilitaries as a whole. Fay (1999) posits that the IRA was shaken to its very core
in the aftermath of the bombing as evidenced by their “express[ing] deep regret for the bomb.”
(p.154). As the bombing occurred on Remembrance Day, a day to remember fallen soldiers in
the British military (independent of religion), many felt this bomb was a grotesque
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miscalculation by an already suffering PIRA. Further, criticisms from the international
community “gave the Republicans cause for serious reconsideration of IRA strategy”(p.154).
Hennessey (1997) outlines how a general trend of strategy reassessment by the Republican camp
was further bolstered by solidarity talks between the moderate SDLP and Left Wing Sinn Fein in
1988.
Synthesis
In the aftermath of Bloody Friday, the Dublin and Monoghan Bombings, the Mountbatten
assassination, the Warrenpoint Ambush, and the Brighton Hotel Bombing, neither Loyalist nor
Nationalist paramilitaries admitted any wrongdoings, let alone apologized. Enniskillen was
different in that the subsequent backlash was not characterized by a noticeable escalation in the
conflict. It is at this point that we see the negative conflict phase of The Troubles begin to
collapse on itself. The conflict became so negative that many of the very actors carrying out the
atrocities began to question the morality of their campaign.
Conclusion
The violence that plagued Ireland and Great Britain during the escalation period of The
Troubles is an example of negative, destructive conflict. While an isolated analysis of each of the
events of the escalation period (1972-1987) would yield a confusing array of violence, anarchy,
and sociopolitical turmoil, a sequential analysis framed by Augsberger’s four tendencies of
negative conflict, culminates in the validation of Augsberger’s assertion that conflict is negative
and destructive when “participants are dissatisfied with the outcomes and all feel they have lost
as a result of the conflict” (Augsberger 1992, 47). In other words, Augsberger’s theory that
negative conflict produces an a feeling of loss on both sides would be disproved by a singular
examination of an event like the Warrenpoint Ambush—where the PIRA emerged jubilant and
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the British army questioning itself. However, when a one-sided event such as the Warrenpoint
Ambush is contextualized within the bigger picture— as a part of a series of events that
ultimately led to the PIRA reassessing itself internally— we see that the escalation period (19721987) is actually a process of negative, destructive conflict. It is a process within a bigger
process of Conflict Transformation.
4.3 The 1981 Hunger Strikes: Failure to Recognize Oppositional Legitimacy
The most troublesome years of the conflict in Northern Ireland were undoubtedly the
1970s and 1980s. As we have seen, these years were marred by countless acts of senseless
violence directed at military targets, political figures, and civilians. But among the most widely
scrutinized and preventable deaths of The Troubles are the deaths of ten Republican Paramilitary
hunger strikers, who starved themselves to death while serving jail time in 1981 in an attempt to
put pressure on the British Government to improve conditions in the prisons for paramilitary, or
as they saw themselves, political, prisoners. The Hunger Strikes of 1981 occurred following a
series of failed protests known the Dirty Protest and Blanket Protest as well as the first hunger
strikes in 1980. Throughout the duration of the 1981 Republican Hunger Strikes, the British
Government refused to reinstate political status for all paramilitary prisoners (although there
were special exemptions). When demands were softened by Republicans and reduced to five
basic privileges, the British Government stood pat, continually denying paramilitary prisoners
the right to:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Not wear a prison uniform;
Not do prison work;
Free association with other prisoners;
Increased mail and external interaction;
Restoration of remission lost through protest.
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Patrick Coy argues that empowerment and recognition are at the heart of transformative
mediation (Coy, 2009:68) but as the conflict in Northern Ireland plunged into its darkest period
in the late 1970s and 1980s, it was clear that neither Nationalist nor Unionist was making
concrete steps in moving towards developing mutual understanding and recognition. For every
step toward conflict resolution taken during the 1970s and 1980s it seemed that paramilitary
violence forced Northern Ireland and its people to take two backward. The Hunger Strikes of
1981 represented extremes of both Nationalist and Unionist ideology, indicative of the
fundamental disconnect present in Northern Ireland during the height of The Troubles.
When framed by Coy’s theory on transformative mediation, the Republican Hunger
Strikes of 1981 illustrate just how divided a society Northern Ireland was. As paramilitary
violence continually escalated during the early 1980s the Hunger Strikes of 1981 made it clear
that Republican paramilitaries and the British Government were seeing a completely different
conflict. Over a period of seven months, ten Republican prisoners took their own lives by
refusing food in protest of the British Government’s continued refusal to recognize the political
nature of their cause. When the strike ended in October 1981 there were only informal
indications that any of the five demands would be met. There would be no reinstatement of
political status. There would be no empowerment and there would be no recognition.
Primary
Irish Times
The following five Irish Times articles describe the sequence of events that transpired
between March and October during the 1981 Republican Hunger Strikes. As continued demands
for acknowledgement of political status for paramilitary prisoners fell on deaf ears, Republican
prisoners turned once more to hunger striking in March of 1981. The outset of the strike is noted
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by the Irish Times: “DIRTY PROTEST ENDED BY 400 REPUBLICAN PRISONERS” (Irish
Times, March 3, 1981). The article quotes that the strike is, “a move which, it seems certain, will
increase the pressure on the Provisional hunger striker, Bobby Sands, to carry his fast through
death if necessary. The article continues that Sands “must now feel that not just the Provisionals
outside the prison but also his colleagues inside are now entirely dependent on him to win
concessions from the British Government.” As the British Government refused to acknowledge
Sands and his fellow hunger strikers, Bobby Sands starved to death on May 5th, 1981, and the
Irish Times led with: “SANDS DIES ON 66TH DAY.” The front-page article mourns “Mr.
Bobby Sands, the 27 year old Republican Hunger Striker and Westminster MP, [who] died in the
hospital wing of the Maze Prison, Long Kesh, early this morning.”
The strike carried on throughout the summer and on August 25th, the Irish Times again
led with a hunger strike article: “SIXTH IRA PRISONER JOINS HUNGER STRIKE.” This
article highlights that ten hunger strikers have died since April and also cites Republican
prisoners who issued a statement reading, “with ten hunger strikers dead and even more innocent
civilians we ask when is the Dublin Government, the SDLP and the Church going to end their
respective postures of inactivity and act vigorously and decisively to save any further loss of
life?” An unflinching political response by the British ultimately led to the end of the protest in
early October, as it was clear to Republican prisoners that they would have to approach their
demands differently. The Irish Times on October 5th, 1981 released a statement authored by
Republican prisoners in the H Blocks, titled “WHY THE PRISONERS ENDED THEIR
PROTEST.” The statement cites British reneging on concessions to prisoners following first
Hunger Strike (1980) as the reason for second hunger strike and also claims that Bobby Sands
was “murdered by British Callousness and vindictiveness.” It further criticizes the “Dublin Bloc
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of Fianna Fail, Fine Gael, and Labour [as] accessories to legalized murder of 10 committed
Irishmen who died heroically in the long tradition of Republican resistance to British
Occupation, oppression and injustice in Ireland.” Furthermore, the statement questions the
hypocrisy of the Republic of Ireland’s official stance toward the Hunger Strikers, as jails in the
Republic of Ireland maintained a policy consistent with their demands. The prisoners concluded
by reaffirming their “commitment to the achievement of the five demands by whatever means…
necessary and expedient, rul[ing] nothing out.”
Following the cessation of the strikes, the British Government announced that small
changes were forthcoming in the prison system, and the Irish Times led with: “PRISON
CHANGES TO BE KNOWN SHORTLY” on October 6, 1981. Still the article notes that “any
changes in the prison regime may fall far short of the demands made by the protesting prisoners,
and Northern Ireland office sources were indicating that changes would be of a minor nature
rather than a radical switch in prison policy.” Furthermore, indicating the blanket-nature of any
concessions to prisoners in Northern Ireland, the article reads “any changes announced will
automatically apply to all prisoners in Northern Ireland prisons, so that there can be no
suggestion that the Republican prisoners in the Maze achieved the concessions for themselves
through their protest.” Still, Unionist organizations felt their government had let them down,
noted by the DUP who “sent a telegram to Mrs. Thatcher saying that concessions to the
Republican prisoners would sully the memory of the 64 people killed since the hunger strike in
March, and would condemn more people to death by giving the PIRA a reason to carry on.”
London Times
The London Times followed the course of the 1981 Hunger Strikes closely, publishing
updates on the prisoners and on the governments monitoring them. The article that marks the
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beginning of the 1981 strike highlights the ideological gap between Maze prisoners and the
British Government. The March 2nd, 1981 headline for the London Times reads: “IRA
PRISONERS’ LEADER BEGINS HUNGER STRIKE” and notes that “the prisoners contend
that the [British] government has failed to carry out verbal promises given at the time [following
the 1980 hunger strike] about living conditions of terrorist inmates.” It is interesting to note here
the use of the word ‘terrorist’ instead of ‘paramilitary,’ ‘republican,’ or even ‘Provisional’ (in
reference to the PIRA). Upon Bobby Sands’ death on May 5th, the Times read: “SANDS DIES
IN MAZE PRISON AFTER 66 DAYS.” This article, while titled nearly identically to the Irish
Times story, portrays Sands’ death as “needless and pointless,” noting, “too many have died by
violence in Northern Ireland.” The article notes that Sands even ignored his mother, who
eventually stopped appealing to him to end his hunger strike.
A little less than a month later, the London Times ran an editorial piece begging the
question “SHOULD THE TERRORISTS BE GIVEN AIRTIME?” (June 4th, 1981). As the
hunger strikes were an international media sensation that negatively portrayed the British
Government, the article highlights the danger of potentially putting wind in the sails of the IRA
by publicizing them (either negatively or positively). The editorial asserts that the IRA is not
only seeking to undermine [British] society, but they are pursuing their ends by violence…” and
furthermore, “they are seeking to either frighten or exasperate the British people into pulling out
of Northern Ireland.” Additionally, the article quotes Prime Minister Thatcher, who reiterates
media “can give convicted criminals on hunger strike the myth of martyrdom they crave, but…
nothing would be more damaging than misinformation and lack of balance.”
In the June 8th article “FIFTH MAN JOINS HUNGER STRIKE AT THE MAZE” the
London Times makes note of the IRA’s desire to keep at least one prisoner near death at all times
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to apply pressure to the British Government, stating “the period of respite since the last hunger
striker death is seen as a tactical error; the next death is not likely until late this month.” Toward
the end of the strike, an October 3rd article titled “END OF MAZE HUNGER STRIKE IN
SIGHT” highlights how the combination of family intervention and lack of any real pressure on
the British Government to resolve the strike are very likely to bring an end to the strike. The
Strike finally ended on October 3rd, 1981, and an article two days later titled “FOUR HUNDRED
STAY ON BLANKET PROTEST” summarized the events of the strike. It read: “…in the 216
days since Bobby Sands started the hunger strike, the two communities in Northern Ireland have
become more polarized than ever.” As a result of this, there was a marked increase in casualties
on either side of the conflict. The hunger strikes “whipped up support among people who had
grown tired of the IRA… recruits flocked to join.” And while the article notes that Sands’
“death brought demonstrations to the streets of New York, Paris and Rome” the failure of the
hunger strikes to achieve the stated demands of Republican prisoners “usefully deflates the myth
of invincibility of the IRA.”
Academic
The Republican Hunger Strikes at Maze Prison in 1981 made apparent, through their
protracted run, the British Government’s unwillingness to recognize political legitimacy claimed
by Republican prisoners during The Troubles. Much like Bloody Sunday a decade earlier, the
hunger strikes of 1981 revived the Republican movement’s political fortunes by inflicting severe
emotional trauma on the Catholic-Nationalist community in Northern Ireland (Hennessey
1997:260). Bell’s 1993 work, The Irish Troubles posits that the 1981 Hunger Strikes, like
Bloody Sunday, once again involved a previously apathetic population in a conflict that had
violently escalated during the 1970s. Once again a “nation’s history of denial and suffering
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because they were Catholic and Irish was recalled and refashioned” (Bell, 1993:609). Also
contributing to this escalation of anger was Prime Minister Thatcher’s staunch refusal to consider
the idea that ‘Republican’ prisoners were anything but common criminals. Hennessey (1997)
makes note of Thatcher’s statement that the British Government is “not prepared to consider
special category status for certain groups of people serving sentences for crime. Crime is crime is
crime, it is not political” (p.261). Also making mention of Thatcher’s perceived callousness in
managing the hunger strikes is Fay (2009), positing that Thatcher’s stance was integral in further
escalating animosity on the Republican side (p.62). While Sands and his compatriots saw
themselves as political prisoners, Thatcher reiterated (upon Sands’ death) that “Mr. Sands was a
convicted criminal, he took his own life… a choice his organization did not allow many of its
own victims” (Hennessey 1997:261). J.J. Lee (1989) feels that the British Government’s
“handling of the whole H Block situation was inept to the point of criminality. It threatened to
endanger the political stability of not only Northern Ireland, but the Republic” (p.154) as well—
consequently risking a dramatic expansion of the conflict.
Synthesis
The discord between Republican prisoners and the British Government represents the
very core of The Troubles. On one side were the Republican Hunger Strikers, imprisoned
individuals who didn’t believe that they were political prisoners, they knew they were political
prisoners. On the other side was the British Government, who didn’t just believe Republican
prisoners were criminals; they knew Republican prisoners were criminals (echoed quite clearly
by Prime Minister Thatcher). If there is one thing we can take away from the hunger strikes,
more clearly than any other event during The Troubles, it is that both Republican paramilitaries
and the British Government viewed the relationship they had with each other through a
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completely different lens. Bell (1993) supports this, arguing that the prisoners “… in Maze or the
Kesh, whether criminals or patriots did not matter as long as no one made the other acquiesce in
the opposing reality” (p.627). To both sides of the conflict, the Republican Hunger Strikes of
1981 were about refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of the opponent. Ten Republican
Prisoners did so by starving themselves to death while the British Government did so by failing
to recognize prisoners’ demands, thereby letting them starve to death.
The Republican Hunger Strikes of 1981 embody the antithesis of Coy’s (2009) theory on
transformative conflict mediation. The lack of recognition of legitimacy by either side is integral
to understanding why violent conflict continued throughout the duration of The Troubles. As the
participants on both sides of the conflict were far from recognizing the legitimacy of the other,
they were just as far from moving toward transformative conflict mediation. During and
following the hunger strikes, the conflict in Northern Ireland was seen essentially as a violent
clash of cultural and political ideologies, where two sides refused to mutually acknowledge the
others’ narrative.
Conclusion
It might seem to be an anachronistic error to place the Republican Hunger Strikes of 1981
after the end of a discussion about escalation (which I suggest ends in 1987—six years after the
strikes ended), but it is with good reason. The Hunger Strikes of 1981 undoubtedly were an
integral part of the escalation of The Troubles in the 1970s and 1980s, but they have a more
significant contribution to make to the overall understanding of The Troubles than violent events
like Bloody Friday and the Brighton Hotel Bombing (among others). The Republican Hunger
Strikes were not an example of paramilitaries attacking political, military, and civilian targets.
They were an embodiment of the ideology that drove individuals to commit these acts of

70
violence. The fact that ten individuals were willing to sacrifice their own lives in hopes of
providing legitimacy to their cause shows that The Troubles were not simply about the
perpetuation of violence and anarchy. The fact that the British Government refused to grant
political status to these protesters despite worldwide attention for the strikers, shows how firmly
they believed these individuals were criminals. The Republican Hunger Strikes of 1981 show
just how far the Northern Ireland still had to go in pursuit of peace.
4.4 Building Peace: Conflict Transformation and the Northern Ireland Peace Agreements.
I have outlined some of the more acrimonious aspects of The Troubles of Northern
Ireland in previous sections. This section is devoted to an exploration of the evolution of positive
conflict, and peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. Between 1973 and 1998, four unique peace
agreements and declarations illustrate how a society torn apart by paramilitary violence,
ideological differences, and fear, attempted to reconcile the wrongdoings of the past in an
attempt to create and sustain peace. The Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 was the first such
attempt at peace, lasting less than a year only to be dismantled by Unionist opposition. The
Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 marked the second significant attempt by both British and Irish
camps at forging peace during The Troubles. The ideologies pushed forward in this agreement
set the table for the Downing Street Declaration of 1993, which laid the framework for the
groundbreaking peace deal known as the Belfast Agreement (also known as the Good Friday
Agreement). With each subsequent agreement, each side conceded more to the other,
representing a mutual commitment to transforming “negative destructive conflict into positive
conflict [by dealing with] structural, behavioral, and attitudinal aspects of conflict” (Berghof
Foundation’s definition of Conflict Transformation). The peaceful progress signified by these
four agreements, when framed by the incredibly violent, negative events of The Troubles
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discussed in sections 4.1 through 4.3, articulates the overall importance of Conflict
Transformation (as defined by the Berghof foundation) in engineering sustainable conflict
resolution.
4.4a The Sunningdale Agreement (1973): A Motion Towards Peace
The Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 was an early attempt to establish a powersharing
Northern Ireland executive. As discussed earlier, the years prior to 1973 were among the most
tumultuous ones of The Troubles. Internment, 1969 Riots, and Bloody Sunday were major
contraindications against the legitimacy of the existing sociopolitical environment in Northern
Ireland in the late 1960s and early 1970s. When the Sunningdale Agreement was approved, it
proposed numerous solutions to problems plaguing Northern Ireland. Among them was a
Council of Ireland, composed of ministers from the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland,
whose primary function was to cooperate on matters of cultural and economic importance. Other
stipulations highlighted the importance of cross-community support of the police force and a
desire to create a cross-border jurisdiction for an all-Ireland court. Though the Sunningdale
Agreement was eventually rendered ineffective by widespread opposition (though primarily
Unionist), it sought to address root causes of The Troubles. Sunningdale created a Council of
Ireland and pushed for a reexamination of the RUC, thereby marking the first step in a lengthy
and uncertain journey towards peace.
Primary
Summary of the Text of the Agreement (Document text provided by Cain.ulst.ac.uk)
The Sunningdale Agreement is divided into twenty paragraphs detailing the aspirations of
both the Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister both individually and as a whole. Paragraph
three articulates, “the people of the Republic, together with a minority in Northern Ireland as
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represented by the SDLP delegation, continue to uphold the aspiration toward a United Ireland.”
However, it also recognizes that “the only unity they [want] to see [is] a unity established by
consent.” Placing faith in the prospective success of the agreement, the British Government
subscribed to the idea that an overhaul of security policy in Northern Ireland could be addressed
“as soon as the security problems were resolved and the new institutions [set forth by the
agreement] were seen to be working effectively, they would wish to discuss… normal policing
and how this might be achieved.” The agreement also sets forth ground rules for the return of
executive powers to Stormont.
Irish Times
The Irish Times ran a story following the approval of the Sunningdale Agreement with
the December 10th, 1973 headline: “COUNCIL OF IRELAND IS AGREED: DUBLIN
ACKNOWLEDGES THE STATUS OF THE NORTH UNTIL MAJORITY EXPRESSES
DESIRE FOR CHANGE.” The article makes note that the Irish Government recognizes that it is
up to the people of Northern Ireland to decide on any change to their constitutional status. Also
discussed is the importance of fair policing, and that prospects of an all-Ireland court are
incredibly unlikely due to conflicts over international jurisdiction.
London Times
Across the Irish Sea in Britain, the London Times led with “AGREEMENT ON A
COUNCIL OF IRELAND, FOUR DAY TALKS END IN DEAL ON POLICE, INTERNEES”
(December 10, 1973). The article suggests that the Sunningdale Agreement was designed to
“change relations substantially between Belfast and Dublin.” Making note of the statement
released by Brian Faulker, then Chief Executive of Northern Ireland, the article quotes “we now
have a very considerable achievement… which can lead to greater cooperation between North
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and South.” Cautious optimism is expressed by The Times, but it also highlights opposition from
both sides of the political spectrum, especially the Unionist camp.
Academic
The Unionist outrage noted by the London Times the day after the passage of the
Sunningdale Agreement snowballed in the following months, ultimately leading to the Ulster
Worker’s Council (UWC) Strike and the eventual collapse of the powersharing executive in
Northern Ireland. Unionists opposed the agreement primarily on the grounds that it was
predicated on ‘interference’ by a foreign government (the Republic of Ireland) on the internal
affairs of Northern Ireland. This opposition was made blatantly obvious by the subsequent UWC
strike (Porter, 1993:46-47) and the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings (section 4.2b). Fay (1999)
agrees, arguing that the UWC strike rendered the powersharing executive useless (p.64). Lee
(1989) expresses a similar belief, casting doubts on the strength of the executive, stating that it
was “brutally clear that the executive had no mandate” (p.444). Furthermore, the Council of
Ireland began to be perceived as largely symbolic and parties in British and Irish camps began to
stop supporting it. Sunningdale was, according to Lee (1989) “dismantled out of mistrust and
fear of the opposition” and “a lost opportunity for a new start” (444-445).
Synthesis
While Lee (1989) feels Sunningdale was a lost opportunity for a new start, it was more
than just that. Sunningdale is the first semblance we see of Conflict Transformation during The
Troubles. Implemented as The Troubles were ‘leaving the gate’ so to speak, Sunningdale was
dismantled because its goals did not match those of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland.
While British and Irish politicians may have outwardly stated that they were seeking a peaceful
solution to the violence in Northern Ireland, the sociopolitical environment in which it was
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implemented in was hardly ready for reconciliation. On Brahm’s curve of conflict intensity,
Sunningdale is located right after “Conflict Emergence” (section 4.1) and during “Conflict
Escalation” (section 4.2). Furthermore, doubts exist as to whether Faulkner and Cosgrave
actually felt as if they were conceding anything to the opposition. Faulkner Felt that Sunningdale
diminished the Republic’s territorial claim to Northern Ireland, while Taoiseach Cosgrave felt he
had ceded nothing of the sort to Faulkner. Sunningdale failed not only because it lacked
sustained support from moderate platforms, but also hard line Nationalists and Unionists.
Furthermore, it was born in an era of ‘deeply dividing’ events in the Northern Irish community,
such as Bloody Sunday, Bloody Friday, and the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings. Still, what is
often forgotten is the importance of Sunningdale, despite its rapid collapse, as the first attempt to
address root causes of The Troubles through peaceful political means. In doing so, it became the
symbolic first step toward Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland.
4.4b The Anglo Irish Agreement (1985): Legitimacy of the ‘Other’ Grows
The Anglo-Irish Agreement was a 1985 peace agreement between the United Kingdom
and the Republic of Ireland, which, like Sunningdale, stipulated that the Government of the
Republic of Ireland be given an advisory role in the administration of the Government of
Northern Ireland. The document was somewhat ambiguously worded to provide a platform for
open dialogue between the British and Irish Government. Despite the agreement’s failure to
garner the support across the spread of the Unionist camp and inability to bring an immediate
end to political violence in Northern Ireland, the Anglo-Irish Agreement represents yet another
step forward in the process of Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland by virtue of the fact
that it was engineered to set a precedent of sustained engagement pursuing peace.
Primary
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Summary of the Text of the Agreement (Document text provided by Cain.ulst.ac.uk)
The Anglo-Irish agreement set forth provisions quite similar to Sunningdale, but they
were more loosely worded so as to promote constructive dialogue. Additionally, the tone of the
agreement is more expressive of a desire to continue the peace process, suggesting that the
architects of the agreement recognized that conclusive, direct wording would likely dismantle the
peace process as it did in the wake of the Sunningdale Agreement. The document recognizes “the
need for continuing efforts to reconcile and to acknowledge the rights of the two major traditions
that exist in Ireland.” It also reaffirms both Britain and Ireland’s “total rejection of any attempt to
promote political objectives by violence or the threat of violence” and an unending commitment
to “work together to ensure that those who adopt or support such methods do not succeed.” The
document also expresses the importance of genuine recognition and acceptance of the “rights…
and identities of the two communities in Northern Ireland.” In a nod to a historical tradition of
Nationalist abstention (a trend that was just beginning to disappear in the 1980s), the agreement
conveyed a desire “for two communities to participate fully in the structures and processes of
government—living in peace.” In addition to the calculated wording of the Anglo-Irish
Agreement, the actual content of the agreement provides a framework for the development of a
cross-community cohesion. It sets forth guidelines for the new Intergovernmental Council to be
set up between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, but also recognizes that this
Council will have no operational responsibilities in the internal bureaus of Northern Ireland’s
government. The document also stresses the importance of a review of all aspects of life in
Northern Ireland, especially in the realm of equal opportunity employment and cross-community
recognition of police authority in Northern Ireland.
Irish Times
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On November 16th, 1985, the Irish Times headline highlighted passage of the Anglo-Irish
Agreement, reading: “ROLE IN NORTH FOR REPUBLIC AGREED: INTERNATIONAL
SUPPORT AND PLEDGE FOR US AID.” The Times notes that the new peace agreement is
much like Sunningdale, but “without its provision for a devolved power-sharing administration.”
Still, the Times makes mention of the fact that the lack of a new devolved power-sharing
executive is actually compensated for by “other mandates of the agreement regarding fair
governance.” The article reminds readers of the significance of the new peace agreement,
quoting Taoiseach Fitzgerald, “nationalists [can] now raise their heads knowing their position is,
and is seen to be on an equal footing with that of members of the Unionist community.” Still, the
article notes, numerous parties including the UUP, Sinn Fein, and Fianna Fail did not support the
agreement.
London Times
The cautious optimism expressed by the Irish Times is not matched by the London
Times. The headline for November 16th, 1985 read “THATCHER AIMS FOR ULSTER PEACE
IN HISTORIC DEAL.” A sub-headline follows “MINISTER QUITS IN PROTEST.” Much like
Sunningdale, the Times notes that protest is widespread in Northern Ireland over the involvement
of a foreign power, which was the impetus for the resignation of Mr. Ian Gow, Minister of the
State at the Treasury. The article continues, “Unionist leaders have withdrawn all cooperation
with ministers and are to boycott official bodies.” In an attempt to further clarify the issue of the
Intergovernmental Council of Ireland, the article makes note that security matters in Northern
Ireland and Great Britain will never be devolved.
Academic
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There is a general consensus in academic literature is that the Anglo-Irish Agreement of
1985 failed to directly achieve its stated goal of achieving peace in Northern Ireland. However,
the overall impression of the agreement is that it was merely a stepping-stone in the path to
peace. Lee (1989) expressed doubt about the agreement (keep in mind he was writing just a few
years after the agreement), arguing that the Intergovernmental Council “fell far short of forum
aspirations, but nevertheless gave the Republic a voice in Northern Ireland affairs” (p.456).
Writing several years later, Hennessey (1997) highlights that the Anglo-Irish Agreement came
about as a result of increasing legitimacy of the other, arguing that in the early-to-mid 1980s,
“the British Government… was confronted with the problem of … increasing electoral support
for Sinn Fein” (p.270). It is important to remember the widespread impact that the Republican
Hunger Strikes (section 4.3) had on drawing worldwide attention to the legitimacy of the
Nationalist cause. Even Thatcher herself acknowledged that at the time, “the present dialogue
with the Irish Government represented the best hope of improving co-operation,… security,…
peace and stability in Northern Ireland (Hennessey 1997, p.272). While the Anglo-Irish
Agreement was far from a perfect peace agreement, Porter (2003) argues that it had far more
staying power than Sunningdale, as its stipulations remained in place until they were replaced by
those set forth by the Belfast Agreement in 1998.
Synthesis
The Anglo-Irish Agreement is notable in an analysis of Conflict Transformation
primarily because its chief purpose was to create a constructive dialogue between two parties
who had failed to see eye-to-eye for decades. While Sunningdale collapsed due to Unionist
opposition, the Anglo-Irish Agreement was worded so that it allowed room for opposition. If
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anything, it embraced opposition (peaceful, political opposition), and in doing so, it represented
the acknowledgement of “the other” by both sides.
Still, the agreement was met with mixed reaction, especially from the Ulster Unionist
Party (UUP) who felt they, according to UUP Leader Ian Paisley, “had been betrayed by
Margaret Thatcher.” Paisley’s disgust with the Anglo-Irish Agreement was largely due to his
belief that Thatcher was trying to appease Nationalists, when in fact she claimed the agreement
was actually an attempt to turn pragmatic Nationalists against the IRA by paving the way to
peace through political means. This recognition ceded to Nationalists, though designed to
undermine the IRA, in many ways, legitimized the Nationalist cause (and somewhat ironically
the IRA), and alienated Unionists. However, the agreement did not alienate either side to the
point of a derailment of the peace process. Peace was beginning to take hold. In the eyes of many
the agreement “marked in principle a deeper recognition than ever before by the British
Government of the legitimacy of the Republic’s concern with Northern Ireland, and of its
potential contribution to the resolution of the Ulster question” (Lee 1989:456-457). The AngloIrish Agreement did not cause an end to the violence in Northern Ireland, an unfortunate
outcome that might make it seem like another failed attempt at building peace in a deeply
divided society. However, the cross-community dialogue it sought to foster was integral in
creating an environment conducive to peace, changing the relational system of conflict in
Northern Ireland. Lee (1989), writing without the support of over two decades of subsequent
history, feels that the agreement was “ a modest, but not insignificant concession to
reality”(457). Briefly returning to the Enniskillen Bombing of 1987 (two years after the
agreement was signed) we can now more completely understand just why widespread reaction,
even within the most Republican circles, was so negative. As Fitzgerald was quoted in the Irish
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Times the day after the agreement was signed “Nationalists can stand shoulder to shoulder and
be seen on an equal footing as Unionists in the community” (Irish Times, November 16, 1985).
As the community in Northern Ireland moved towards peace and equality, brutal acts of violence
such as the Enniskillen Bombing, became more widely condemned, signifying that a
transformation was occurring and the a culture of peace was developing.
4.4c The Downing Street Declaration (1993): “A New Era of Trust”
In 1993, John Major and Albert Reynolds, heads of government from the United
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, respectively, issued a joint statement now known as the
Downing Street Declaration. This was a twelve-point document, which summarized the desires
of both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland to achieve peace in Northern Ireland
within the decade. Peace Agreements in 1973 and 1985 had varying degrees of success, but both
indicated a mutual commitment by Britain and Ireland to engineering peace in the contested
region of Northern Ireland. For the first time ever, the Downing Street Declaration stated that
parties linked with paramilitaries would be allowed take part in talks if linked paramilitary
groups abandoned violent conflict. This statement represented a unique turning point in The
Troubles, suggesting that both sides were willing to recognize the legitimacy of the cause of
formerly violent organizations by holding talks with their political wings so long as violence
ceased. The declaration was made around the same time SDLP leader John Hume and Sinn Fein
leader Gerry Adams were developing a new political strategy for the Republican community in
Northern Ireland, characterized by peaceful political progress. The declaration, coupled with the
results of the Hume-Adams Talks was enough to produce a brief PIRA ceasefire in 1994. The
new era of trust promised by the Downing Street Agreement further entrenched Great Britain,
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Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland in the notion that peace could be achieved in
Ulster.
Primary
Summary of the Text of the Declaration (Document text provided by Cain.ulst.ac.uk)
The Downing Street Declaration recognized that the “most urgent and important issue
facing the people of Ireland, North an South, and the British and Irish Governments together, is
to remove the conflict, to overcome the legacy of history and to heal the divisions…” resulting
from The Troubles. The Declaration reasserts the right of the people of Northern Ireland to selfdetermination and the British Government’s desire to “see peace, stability, and reconciliation
established by agreement among all the people inhabiting the island.” Furthermore, Reynolds
and Major cite a renewed desire to “work to create a new era of trust… in which every effort
must be made to build a new series of trust between [nationalist and unionist] communities.”
Echoing the wording of the Anglo-Irish agreement eight years prior, Taoiseach Reynolds
“recognizes the need to engage in dialogue which would address the honesty and integrity of the
fears of all traditions.” Most importantly, the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister are “determined
to build on the fervent wish of both their peoples to see old fears and anomalies replaced by a
climate of peace.” In the statements that followed the release of the actual declaration itself,
Reynolds said “I was not prepared through inaction to condemn the people of Northern Ireland to
another 25 years of violence. They deserve better” The Taoiseach continues “…let December
1993 be the moment we begin to resolve the conflict in Northern Ireland… no one should be
afraid of peace. Here is the opportunity for peace. Here, let us all make our stand” (December 15,
1993).
Irish Times
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Recognizing the incredible significance of the Downing Street Declaration, the Irish
Times hailed the declaration, leading off with “PROSPECT OF IRA CEASEFIRE IN THE
BALANCE AFTER JOINT DECLARATION. SINN FEIN PLANS TALKS WITHIN NEXT
FEW DAYS” (December 16, 1993). Once again, the article makes note of Unionist opposition,
as the UUP “expressed deep misgivings of yesterday’s statement.” The Times embraces the
declaration as a “historic affirmation that the British Government would uphold the democratic
wish of ‘a greater number of the people’ of Northern Ireland to support the Union.” Of greater
significance is the mention of the prospect of Sinn Fein once again entering the fold in
government peace talks.
London Times
The London Times chose to highlight the uncertainty it felt that prevailed throughout
Northern Ireland following the release of the declaration reading “ULSTER HOLDS ITS
BREATH ON PEACE ACCORD” (December 16, 1993). The article describes John Major and
Albert Reynolds as standing “shoulder to shoulder” challenging “the men of violence to put
down their weapons and negotiate a permanent peace in Northern Ireland.” Again, “… hardline
Unionists were left isolated with cries of treachery” but Major encouraged them to “grasp the
opportunity for peace” because “another might not come their way.” In a powerful statement, the
article quotes Major as saying “we cannot go on spilling blood in the name of the past.” An
important analysis presented in the Times article discusses how both Reynolds and Major found
a way to appease the majority of concerned parties in the release of the declaration. Still, Mr. Ian
Paisley expressed his disgust with being “told that in three months’ time the IRA who had
butchered, slaughtered, and murdered his constituents would be invited to sit down as
constitutional politicians if they ceased their violence.” In a stern defiance to Unionist-bloc
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opposition Prime Minister Major responded “I wish to take action to make sure there’s no
bloodshed of this sort, no more coffins carried away week after week because politicians will not
have the courage to sit down, address the problems and find away through.”
Academic
Contrary to Sunningdale and the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the Downing Street Declaration
was not a legislative document. It was instead a reassertion of a commitment to conflict
resolution. The Downing Street Declaration reminded the population of Great Britain and Ireland
that peaceful progress would be the only path forward for all parties hoping to gain from the
peace process. Perhaps most importantly, the declaration (and the Hume-Adams Talks) put
increased pressure on the IRA to cease its armed campaign (Hennessey 1997:288). While the
cessation of the IRA’s armed campaign was vital to the peace process, Coakley (2002) argues the
mandate of a referendum in the Republic of Ireland into any future peace agreements in Northern
Ireland was equally valuable in developing mutual trust between both governments and both
communities (p.25). Viewing Sunningdale and the Anglo-Irish Agreements as essentially
impotent peace agreements, Fay (1999) remarks that the Downing Street Declaration was “the
beginning of the peace process” (p.64).
Synthesis
Fay’s (1999) assertion that the Downing Street Declaration was the ‘beginning’ of the
peace process is valid, but fails to recognize Lederach’s position that conflict is best analytically
framed as a process. As positive Conflict Transformation (concentrated efforts at peacebuilding)
is both a process and an end result (Berghof definition of Conflict Transformation), it seems
incorrect to say that the Downing Street Declaration marked the beginning of the peace process
in Northern Ireland. The peace process, though in fledgling form, began shortly after the conflict
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erupted, through dialogue—both positive and negative. This paper locates the Downing Street
Declaration as part of the process of Conflict Transformation. The foundation of the Downing
Street Agreement was built on top of years of conflict and patchwork peace agreements. Its
primary purpose was to bury the violence of the past and fill in the gaps of prior peace
arrangements by displaying an even stronger commitment to mutual recognition and
understanding. Unlike Sunningdale and the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the Downing Street
Declaration gave political parties and also paramilitary groups time to digest its stated goals.
There was no immediate legislation to vote on—simply just a renewed commitment to peace in
Northern Ireland. The Downing Street Declaration represented a renewed commitment to peace
that would ultimately lead to the most groundbreaking and successful peace agreement in the
history of Northern Ireland.
4.4d The Belfast Agreement (1998): A Conflict Transformed
In 1998 British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Irish Taoiseach Bertie Ahern held peace
talks between eight political parties in Northern Ireland. Included were Sinn Fein and the UUP,
two parties who for the duration of The Troubles had adamantly opposed each other. What
emerged from these talks was the Belfast Agreement, or Good Friday Agreement, which is the
most comprehensive peace agreement to date in the history of Northern Ireland. Provisions of the
agreement included: the removal of the Republic of Ireland’s constitutional claim to Northern
Ireland, the decommissioning of paramilitary organizations, the creation of a new executive, the
creation of a new North-South Ministerial Council, and most controversially, the release of
paramilitary prisoners whose respective organizations upheld their promise to abide by an
indefinite ceasefire following the agreement. The passage of the Belfast Agreement is indicative
of a definite transformation of the conflict in Northern Ireland. With both sides conceding more
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than could have been imaginable in 1968, 1978, or 1988, it is evident that a culture of peace has
truly taken root in Northern Ireland. And while occasional violence still occurs throughout the
reason, it has decreased drastically from the years of The Troubles.
Primary
Summary of the Text of the Agreement (Document text provided by Cain.ulst.ac.uk)
The Belfast Agreement reiterated the positions of both governments on the peace process
in Northern Ireland as the only solution to continued conflict. It contains a legal agreement
between the Irish and British Governments, as well as a second document discussing the
agreements between the eight parties involved in the talks.
The legal section of the document sets forth four provisions that support peace
“partnership, equality, and mutual respect” as the tenets of sociopolitical progress in Northern
Ireland. It also stresses the need to oppose the use of political violence through intragovernmental cooperation and a commitment to democratic and peaceful means of resolving
political differences. The agreement makes official the recognition that both Unionist and
Nationalist views regarding the constitutional position of Northern Ireland are legitimate and that
the United Kingdom is merely upholding the wish of the majority of the people of Northern
Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom. Additionally, it reaffirms the birthright of citizens
of Northern Ireland to obtain Irish citizenship in additional to their given British citizenship.
Most prominently, the first section of the agreement repeals Article 2 and 3 of the Irish
constitution that claims the island of Ireland is one national territory.
Following the legal section, the agreement is divided into three strands. Strand one calls
for the creation of new laws for cross-community legislation, which require both majority and
minority approval. It also stipulates that issues to be voted on by cross-community legislation
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will be designated in advance. If the assembly feels that a certain issue not designated for crosscommunity legislation should be subjected to cross-community legislation such a decision can be
triggered by “petition of concern by a significant minority” (30 members of 108). Furthermore,
strand one calls for the creation an equality commission “to investigate individual complaints
against public bodies.” The strand also deals with the operation of the new assembly, where
delegates will “register a designation of identity” as Nationalist, Unionist, or ‘other’ for the
purposes of cross-community legislation. Strand two outlines the creation of a new North-South
Ministerial Council devised to promote and support “consultation, cooperation, and action within
the Island of Ireland… on matters of mutual interest.” Strand three expresses the desire for the
creation of a British-Irish Council to support “harmonious and mutually beneficial development
of relationships among the people of Great Britain and Ireland” and recognize the “Irish
Government’s special interest in Northern Ireland.”
Outside of the Intergovernmental Councils, the Belfast Agreement outlines a desire to
reexamine the sociopolitical landscape of Northern Ireland by establishing provisions for
“reconciliation and victims of violence, decommissioning, security, police and justice, and
prisoners.” With the establishment of the Northern Ireland Victims Commission, the agreement
notes “it is essential to acknowledge and address the suffering of victims of violence as a
necessary element of reconciliation” and that the most suitable tribute to victims of violence in
Northern Ireland is the sustainable development of a peaceful society. Following a successful
ceasefire, both governments will see to it that paramilitary organizations are successfully and
smoothly decommissioned within approximately two years following the passage of the
agreement. In response to demands for the reduction of British troops in Northern Ireland to
normal appropriate peacetime standards the British Government conceded it “will make progress
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towards… a return as possible to normal security arrangements in Northern Ireland.” This
stipulation also included a British pledge to reduce the number and role of armed forces in
Northern Ireland, the removal of checkpoints and the Emergency Powers Act. It additionally
established the importance of “consultative cooperation with the Irish Government and
respective political parties regarding response to any continuing paramilitary activity.” In the
realm of the police service, the agreement was quite similar to prior agreements and declaration
in stressing the importance of cross-community recognition for the police service and called for a
widespread review and revamping of the police service. Finally, the Belfast Agreement was the
first piece of legislation to officially recognize paramilitary prisoners as more than just common
criminals so long as their organizations agreed to end their armed campaigns. “Both governments
will put in place mechanisms to provide for an accelerated program for the release of prisoners…
convicted of scheduled offences in Northern Ireland.” Also stipulated was the necessity of
governmental facilitation of the reintegration of prisoners by providing sustained support for
them before and after their release “including assistance directed towards availing of
employment opportunities, retraining or re-skilling, and further education.” In sum, the Belfast
Agreement represents the most comprehensive and dynamic piece of legislation in the Northern
Ireland peace process.
Irish Times
Being the most groundbreaking achievement to date in the history of the Northern Ireland
peace process, the Belfast Agreement received international media attention. In the Republic of
Ireland, the Irish Times wrote: “HISTORIC AGREEMENT MARKS NEW BEGINNING FOR
US ALL” with a short sub-headline “LAST MINUTE INTERVENTION BY CLINTON TO
REASSURE UNIONISTS” (Irish Times, April 11, 1998). The article makes mention that the
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agreement is a culmination of almost two years of discussions, concluding with almost thirty-six
hours of uninterrupted discussions. Quoting mediator and former U.S. Senator George Mitchell,
the article reads “I cannot think of a comparable instance when two leaders of governments came
and participated in a round the clock, hands on basis for several days as they have done. Leader
of the SDLP John Hume is quoted as saying the agreement is a “once in a generation” type
opportunity to resolve our deep and tragic conflict.”
London Times
Two London Times articles cover the Belfast Agreement and again express great hope
for the future. The first article discusses the role of external support in sustaining the agreement,
“CLINTON BACKS BEST CHANCE FOR PEACE IN A GENERATION” (London Times,
April 11, 1998). Recalling Major and Reynolds’ efforts some five years prior, the article reads,
“all parties and all the rest of us must stand shoulder to shoulder” in an effort to defy violent
detractors of the agreement. The other article offers a much more sentimental analysis of the
agreement, a major juxtaposition of the thirty years of violence reported in previous years.
“ULSTER CHOOSES HOPE OVER HATE,” (London Times, April 11, 1998), the article reads
triumphantly. Tony Blair further supports these emotions as he boldly states, “courage has
triumphed.” The article also mentions that paramilitary prisoners are to be released within two or
three years of the passage of the agreement provided their organizations abide by the ceasefire.
Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams is also quoted: “Republicans and Nationalists will come to this
document, some with skepticism, most with hope. They will ask whether it offers a chance for
the way forward, and when we democratically have come to a conclusion, we will tell the
world.” Irish Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, co-architect of the agreement stated that the Belfast
Agreement “marks a new beginning for all of us.”
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Academic
Throughout the most recent academic histories of The Troubles in Northern Ireland, the
Belfast Agreement is discussed as a major turning point in The Troubles. In most texts, it marks
the end of The Troubles, and the beginning of a new, less violent, though still controversial era
of Northern Irish politics. The Belfast Agreement was unique because it followed on the coattails
of Unionists deciding to ‘confront’ Sinn Fein (Fay, 1999:65). The driving force behind the
agreement was that it incorporated a wide range of political parties (eight in total), many of
whom had been excluded for generations from the Northern Irish political system, in talks
alongside “two sovereign governments” (Fay, 1999: 65). Furthermore, increased opposition to
paramilitary organizations leading up to the agreement meant that the “IRA campaign ended in
quiet disgrace in the mid-1990s” (Coakley, 2002:130). The end to the IRA campaign, coupled
with “the Good Friday Agreement [Belfast Agreement] of 1998 recognized the interdependence
of the two parts of Ireland and the necessity of their living in peace with each other” (Coakley
2002:130). The Belfast Agreement is generally perceived by scholars of Irish history as the
benchmark of transformative legislation in the peace process in Northern Ireland. It is a
“complex and far reach document that attempts to provide a reasonable balance between
competing claims and aspirations of Unionism and Nationalism, it redefines relations within
“North, North-and-South, and Britain-and-Ireland” (Porter, 2003:197). Most importantly, the
agreement’s desire to decommission paramilitary organizations through recognition was integral
to taking the gun out of Northern Irish politics.
Synthesis
The Belfast Agreement figures more prominently than any other act of protest, violence,
and peace in the course of the transformation of conflict in Northern Ireland because it is the
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most dynamic, comprehensive attempt at dealing with the “structural, behavioral, and attitudinal
aspects of the conflict” (Berghof definition of Conflict Tansformation). Additionally, it goes
further “…than conflict settlement or conflict management” in that its basic tenets are structured
to remove the root causes of the conflict by creating an open dialogue where conflicting parties
can voice their concerns. The agreement voted on in 1998 and implemented in 1999 was
“remarkable because of the fact that unlike any previous initiative, the negotiations that produced
the agreement included political representatives of the main paramilitary organizations” (Porter,
2003:200). The Belfast Agreement not only had the support of the British and Irish Governments
and numerous political parties in Northern Ireland, it had the support of the PIRA, the UVF, and
the UDA. These three paramilitary organizations were responsible for some of the most violent,
appalling moments of The Troubles. For decades, both camps of paramilitary organizations
identified themselves as political actors. In accepting the Belfast Agreement, they accepted that
they could act in a civilized political manner and as a result, the political realm conferred upon
them, and many of their imprisoned colleagues, political status. While Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher refused to concede that any crime could be political, the Belfast Agreement made that
incredibly difficult concession, and indicated to paramilitaries, political parties, and the people of
Northern Ireland that peace, above everything else, was the only way forward.
4.4 Conclusion
The peace process in Northern Ireland very much mirrored the ebb and flow of The
Troubles. An analysis of the peace process, when placed on top of a thorough exploration of The
Troubles (4.1-4.3) produces an image of Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland.
Sunningdale (1973) attempted to bring together a deeply divided society without providing a
clear mechanism by which constructive dialogue could bridge the gap between Nationalist and
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Unionist camps. Twelve years later, the Anglo-Irish Agreement once again attempted to promote
peace, instead this time using loose wording so as to leave the agreement open to interpretation
and constructive debate. The Downing Street Declaration of 1993 aimed to reaffirm a
commitment to peace by both the British Government and the Irish Government. Five years later,
the Belfast Agreement made good on that commitment, producing widespread reforms in the
political and cultural relationships within Northern Ireland, and between the United Kingdom
and the Republic of Ireland.
5. Conclusion: A Conflict Transformed
I would like to briefly return to the definition provided by the Berghof Foundation for
Conflict Studies, which defines Conflict Transformation as:
…[a] generic, comprehensive term referring to actions and processes seeking to alter the
various characteristics and manifestations of violent conflict by addressing the root causes
of a particular conflict over the long term. It aims to transform negative destructive conflict
into positive constructive conflict and deals with structural, behavioral, and attitudinal
aspects of conflict. The term refers to both the process and the completion of the process.
As such, it incorporates the activities of processes such as conflict prevention and conflict
resolution and goes farther than conflict settlement or conflict management.
Between 1968 and 1998, The Troubles of Northern Ireland went from being a latent conflict to
an incredibly violent, negative conflict. Yet somehow today Northern Ireland stands on the
doorstep of peace. This is because a conflict, much like most all other dimensions of human life,
can change and be changed. This change is the ultimate goal of Conflict Transformation.
In 1968 and 1969, a population of Nationalists (mostly Catholic) decided they had put up
with enough and a civil rights movement was born. As Lederach so aptly described, Northern
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Ireland was a deeply divided society, with distinct units of cultural, religious and political
identity. As Nationalists clashed with Unionists over issues such as gerrymandering and equal
representation, Unionists further tightened the stranglehold on the power structure in Northern
Ireland, thus enraging the Catholic, Nationalist population even more. As riots raged throughout
Northern Ireland in 1969, sectarian violence increased and the situation rapidly deteriorated,
prompting Stormont to enlist the assistance of the British Army to restore order. Coupled with
the new security policy of Internment, the presence of the British Army escalated the conflict to
a new level, as it would ultimately bear responsibility for killing fourteen innocent civil rights
protesters during the Bloody Sunday Massacre in 1972.
Following the events of Bloody Sunday, The Troubles rapidly spiraled out of control and
a protracted period of violent, tit-for-tat escalation began—which I call “negative destructive
conflict” which Augsberger argues culminates in a zero-sum gain where all involved parties
emerged feeling they have accomplished little or nothing. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s
violence continued, and while the history of individual events during this time lends credence to
the notion that paramilitary violence may have achieved political progress, the Enniskillen
Bombings in 1987 tell us otherwise. The sheer audacity and widespread condemnation of the
‘Remembrance Day Bombing’ as it is known now, caused the IRA to fracture and reconsider its
position within the Republican movement. While individual events of the escalation period may
have seemed like victories to conflict participants at the time, the ultimate result of escalation
was more violence and more death on either side of the conflict. It did, in fact, produce a feeling
of loss (as Augsberger posits) in both Nationalist and Unionist circles. The escalation period
reminds us, that like Lederach (1997) argues, conflict is a process and must be analyzed as such
rather than a fragmented case-by-case history.
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Rewinding to 1981, an analysis of the Republican Hunger Strikes in Maze Prison gives
us a better understanding of the degree of depth at which The Troubles divided Northern Ireland.
If empowerment and recognition are at the heart of transformative mediation (Coy 2009), the
Republican Hunger Strikes illustrate just how negative a conflict can become if these two ideas
are ignored. The Republican Hunger Strikes are the embodiment of The Troubles: a clash of two
different political narratives, and the failure of either side to legitimize the other. Framed through
a Nationalist lens, ten hunger strikers died in an attempt to gain political status from a corrupt,
oppressive British Government. When examined through a Unionist lens, ten ordinary criminals
died on hunger strike, asking for something they were never entitled to in the first place. It is
hear the fundamental problem of The Troubles is uncovered: the unwillingness of either side of
the conflict to empower and recognize the legitimacy of the other’s concern.
This position enables us to understand why a fledgling peace process, beginning with the
Sunningdale Agreement in 1973, blossomed into one of the most successful stories of Conflict
Transformation in history. In 1973, a year after the British Army massacred 14 civil rights
protesters on Bloody Sunday, and IRA retaliation was responsible for the indiscriminate
slaughter of numerous civilians, the Sunningdale Agreement was signed. A supposed peace
agreement that stipulated a power sharing executive and a cross-border Council of Ireland, it was
rapidly dismantled by Unionist opposition and fear. While white-collar politicians expressed a
desire for peace they could do little to achieve it, as the sociopolitical climate in Northern Ireland
was wracked with fear and lack of trust and was clearly not prepared to constructively engage the
opposition (as evidenced by the UWC strike). The Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) took into
account the pitfalls of Sunningdale, and produced a carefully worded, yet open-ended document
that laid the groundwork for continued constructive cooperation at a cross-community and cross-
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border level. It was around this time that Sinn Fein, the IRA as well as Loyalist paramilitaries
began to reconsider the nature of their campaign. Public support was waning, enlistment was
falling, and culture of peace was developing. The 1993 Downing Street Declaration reaffirmed
that desire and also recognized the importance of having the Republic of Ireland on board with
the peace process as well. Ultimately, the Belfast Agreement in 1998 represented the most
comprehensive step forward in Conflict Transformation in the history of Northern Ireland, as
both sides conceded recognition and legitimacy to the other. Most notably, this recognition came
in the form of the early release of paramilitary prisoners belonging to organizations abiding by
the ceasefire (PIRA, UVF, and UDA), as well as a constitutional change in the Republic of
Ireland removed the Republic’s claim to Northern Ireland.
Looking Forward
At the time this is being written (2011), Northern Ireland is still dealing with the horrors
of the past. Just by reading the Belfast Telegraph every day, one gets a sense that the lines that
divided the country during The Troubles still exist. Investigations are ongoing into the crimes of
the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Sectarian violence still occurs, though not on the same level as it
once did, and the question remains: will The Troubles return to Northern Ireland? That is a
question only time can answer. Yet it is worth recognizing that a proactive engagement by both
Nationalists and Unionists and those in between has historically produced a genuine
transformation. While the stipulations of the Belfast Agreement may not be perfect, they
represent a commitment by both sides of the conflict to work together and even integrate in the
interest of economic development, security, and genuine peace—all of which are crucial to
preventing the growth of negative destructive conflict.
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6. Appendix
1.1

Lynch’s Speech (August 13, 1969)
It is clear now that the present situation cannot be allowed to continue.
It is evident also that the Stormont government is no longer in control of the
situation. Indeed, the present situation is the inevitable outcome of the policies
pursued for decades by successive Stormont governments. It is clear also that
the Irish Government can no longer stand by and see innocent people injured
and perhaps worse. It is obvious that the RUC is no longer accepted as an
impartial police force. Neither would the employment of British troops be
acceptable nor would they be likely to restore peaceful conditions, certainly not
in the long term. The Irish Government have, therefore, requested the British
Government to apply immediately to the United Nations for the urgent dispatch
of a Peace-Keeping Force to the Six Counties of Northern Ireland and have
instructed the Permanent Representative to the United Nations to inform the
Secretary General of this request. We have also asked the British Government to
see to it that police attacks on the people of Derry should cease immediately.
Very many people have been injured and some of them seriously. We
know that many of these do not wish to be treated in Six County hospitals. We
have, therefore, directed the Irish Army authorities to have field hospitals
established in County Donegal adjacent to Derry and at other points along the
Border where they may be necessary.
Recognising, however, that the re-unification of the national
territory can provide the only permanent solution for the problem, it is our
intention to request the British Government to enter into early negotiations with
the Irish Government to review the present constitutional position of the Six
Counties of Northern Ireland.

1.2

Transcript of BBC Broadcast of Bloody Sunday (January 30, 1972)
Reporter: Can you tell me what happened when the Paratroopers
came in Father?
Father Edward Daly: They came in firing. The people, there was no
provocation whatsoever. Uhh
Reporter: Firing what? Rubber bullets?
Father Edward Daly: No, eh, it was Led Bullets they fired, they
seemed to fire in all directions. Ah there’s some rubber bullets too,
they didn’t even seem to fire at (Unintelligible)… It was just
completely outrageous, disgraceful, I don’t know… (Shaking head).
They call themselves an army, it’s utterly disgraceful.
Reporter: You’re quite sure there was nothing fired at them first?
Daly: There was nothing fired at them, sir, I’m absolutely just certain of that I
can speak of this eh, without any difficulty whatsoever because I was there. I
was just standing at the flats when they started to the conclusion and there was
nothing fired at them, positively nothing. Whatsoever. There weren’t even
stones thrown, people ran in all directions and they opened fire. Most people had
their backs to them when they opened fire at the time.
Reporter: A short while ago we filmed you with a white, with a white
handkerchief,
Daly: Yes
Reporter: and about four in your party with a boy who was dead or dying. How
was he shot?
Daly: That little boy was shot when he was running away, he was just a little bit
behind me when he fell. I heard the shot I looked around and…
Reporter: You know him?
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Daly: Yes, he was shot
Reporter: He was a young man wasn’t he?
Daly: He was a young boy I’d say of about fifteen, sixteen, thereabouts.
Reporter: He didn’t have a weapon?
Daly: No, he was just a young boy, about 15, he was running… I was running
too.
Cuts to interview with General Robert Ford
FORD: In fact they did not fire until they were fired upon and my information
at the moment, and it is very, almost immediately after the incident, is that the
Para battalion fired three rounds altogether, after they had something between
ten and twenty fired at them from the area—the flats over there.
Reporter: They fired three rounds only?
FORD: From my information at the moment, they fired three.
Reporter: I believe there are more than three, I’ve seen three dead myself.
FORD: Well they may not have been killed by—by our soldiers.
Reporter: Unintelligible… Are you saying that the paras only opened fire
because they were fired upon first? Because the people in the Bogside are saying
that no shots were fired at the troops as they came in.
FORD: Most certainly absolutely no doubt at all that they were, the
paratroopers did not open up until they’d been fired at.
You’ll remember that the aim of the operation in fact was an arrest operation,
against the hooligans who’d been attacking for a couple of hours.”
Reporter: Yes well have any British troops been hit by gunfire?
FORD: Yes as the paratroopers went in, eh acid bombs were dropped from the
(unintelligible) and two soldiers were injured, one I believe seriously. It was at
this time in fact that the gunmen opened up
Reporter: Two Paras were hit by acid bombs, well have any British soldiers
been hit by bullets?
FORD: None as far as I’m aware of at this moment.
Reporter: Why was it necessary for the paras to take aggressive action at all
and to go into the Bogside instead of just snatching the people at the head of the
procession who were causing the trouble?
FORD: The aggressive action was taken because quite apart from the march, incidentally I was
watching the march and I saw the stewards stop it and indeed try and keep control to us,
unfortunately a hooligan element took over and they came down to our position down here and uh
started to attack the troops as you saw, they attacked them with bricks, stones, very sort of nasty
implements, and including of course a couple of canisters of CS gas. This went on for some time
and it was obviously necessary to restore law and order.
1.3

Widgery Report (10 April, 1972)
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
1. There would have been no deaths in Londonderry on 30 January if those
who organised the illegal march had not thereby created a highly dangerous
situation in which a clash between demonstrators and the security forces was
almost inevitable.
2. The decision to contain the march within the Bogside and Creggan had been
opposed by the Chief Superintendent of Police in Londonderry but was fully
justified by events and was successfully carried out.
3. If the Army had persisted in its "low key" attitude and had not launched a
large-scale operation to arrest hooligans the day might have passed off without
serious incident.
4. The intention of the senior Army officers to use 1 Para as an arrest force and
not for other offensive purposes was sincere.

96
5. An arrest operation carried out in Battalion strength in circumstances in
which the troops were likely to come under fire involved hazard to civilians in
the area which Commander 8 Brigade may have under-estimated.
6. The order to launch the arrest operation was given by Commander 8
Brigade. The tactical details were properly left to CO 1 Para who did not exceed
his orders. In view of the experience of the unit in operations of this kind it was
not necessary for CO 1 Para to give orders in greater detail than he did.
7. When the vehicles and soldiers of Support Company appeared in Rossville
Street they came under fire. Arrests were made; but in a very short time the
arrest operation took second place and the soldiers turned to engage their
assailants. There is no reason to suppose that the soldiers would have opened
fire if they had not been fired upon first.
8. Soldiers who identified armed gunmen fired upon them in accordance with
the standing orders in the Yellow Card. Each soldier was his own judge of
whether he had identified a gunman. Their training made them aggressive and
quick in decision and some showed more restraint in opening fire than others. At
one end of the scale some soldiers showed a high degree of responsibility; at the
other, notably in Glenfada Park, firing bordered on the reckless. These
distinctions reflect differences in the character and temperament of the soldiers
concerned.
9. The standing orders contained in the Yellow Card are satisfactory. Any
further restrictions on opening fire would inhibit the soldier from taking proper
steps for his own safety and that of his comrades and unduly hamper the
engagement of gunmen.
10. None of the deceased or wounded is proved to have been shot whilst
handling a firearm or bomb. Some are wholly acquitted of complicity in such
action; but there is a strong suspicion that some others had been firing weapons
or handling bombs in the course of the afternoon and that yet others had been
closely supporting them.
11. There was no general breakdown in discipline. For the most part the
soldiers acted as they did because they thought their orders required it. No order
and no training can ensure that a soldier will always act wisely, as well as
bravely and with initiative. The individual soldier ought not to have to bear the
burden of deciding whether to open fire in confusion such as prevailed on 30
January. In the conditions prevailing in Northern Ireland, however, this is often
inescapable.
WIDGERY
W. J. Smith, Secretary,
10 April, 1972
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